Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure
Dallin H. Oakst
The exclusionary rule makes evidence inadmissible in court if law
enforcement officers obtained it by means forbidden by the Constitution, by statute or by court rules. The United States Supreme Court
currently enforces an exclusionary rule in state and federal criminal
proceedings as to four major types of'violations: searches and seizures
that violate the fourth amendment, confessions obtained in violation
of the fifth and sixth amendments, identification testimony obtained
in violation of these amendments, and evidence obtained by methods
so shocking that its use would violate the due process clause.1 The exclusionary rule is the Supreme Court's sole technique for enforcing
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392 U.S. 378 (1968). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, applicable only in
federal courts, the exclusionary rule prevents the use of confessions obtained during a
period of detention in excess of the Rule 5(a) requirement of prompt presentment before
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these vital constitutional rights. As such, its importance in relation to
these rights is comparable to the importance of incarceration in the
enforcement of the substantive criminal law. At a time when there
are resounding calls to reconsider the content and administration of
penal sanctions in the substantive criminal law, it is also timely to
reexamine the exclusionary sanction applied to related procedural
rights.
This study concerns the effect of the exclusionary rule on the criminal justice system, particularly on law enforcement personnel. The
subject is limited to the area of search and seizure. In addition to being
the most frequent occasion for application of the exclusionary rule,
search and seizure has two qualities that set it apart from other areas
and make it appropriate for separate study. Evidence obtained by an
illegal search and seizure is just as reliable as evidence obtained by
legal means. This cannot always be said of evidence obtained by improper methods of lineup identification or interrogation. And, for reasons that will be discussed later,2 the exclusion of evidence obtained
by an improper search and seizure is less likely to influence law enforcement behavior than is the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper means of identification or interrogation.
This article will report the state of existing knowledge and discuss
possibilities for further empirical research. It has six parts.
Part I concerns the history and suggested justifications of the exclusionary rule. The normative justification-that courts should not participate in illegal behavior by using the evidence obtained by ithas not been important in determining the outcome of cases. The
Supreme Court has stated that the "single and distinct" purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officers from the
forbidden behavior.
Part II reviews what Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars
have said about the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Most
have hailed it as the best available enforcement technique. Some have
even stated that "experience has taught" that it is effective. But none
has cited any substantial evidence that the rule effectively deters
improper law enforcement behavior.
a magistrate. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Federal courts must also exdude evidence obtained by a violation of the law requiring an officer to give notice of his
authority and purpose before opening a door to make an arrest or execute a warrant in a
private dwelling. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
T. ABBOTT, et al., supra. However, the announcement requirement was practically eliminated in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,
84 Stat. 473 (1970).
2 See text following note 160 infra.
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Part III presents empirical evidence on the effect of the exclusionary
rule on police searches and seizures. Some of this evidence has been
published previously, and some is new. Illegal searches and seizures
seem to be concentrated in a few types of crimes, notably weapons
and narcotics offenses. The data contains little support for the proposition that the exclusionary rule discourages illegal searches and seizures, but it falls short of establishing that it does not.
Part IV reviews the various aspects of deterrence, applies them to
the exclusionary rule, and discusses possible techniques and areas for
further research. No single research method can deal with the enormous complexities involved in attempting to measure the extent to
which law enforcement behavior is affected by the exclusionary rule.
It is suggested that the effect of the rule be studied in smaller segments
by determining what the rule does not accomplish and by examining
some of the negative effects that its use may entail. The last two parts
concern those questions.
Part V discusses limitations upon the deterrent effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule in certain circumstances. These limitations include
the rule's probable inability to deter the large area of police conduct
that is not intended to obtain evidence. for use in prosecution, and
the fact that the exclusionary rule operates under numerous conditions that are unfavorable for deterring the police. The discussion
suggests empirical research to test the factual assumptions underlying
some of these limitations.
Part VI discusses various asserted negative effects of the exclusionary rule, such as the assertion that it fosters false testimony by law
enforcement personnel or that it seriously delays and overloads a
criminal proceeding and diverts attention from the search for truth
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. With respect to some of
the alleged negative effects, the discussion contains suggestions for
empirical research to test the critical facts.
The article concludes with a polemic argument for abolishing the
exclusionary rule as to evidence obtained by searches and seizures,
and replacing it with a practical tort remedy against the offending
officers or their employers.
I.

HISTORY AND

BASIs

OF ExCLUSIONARY

RULE

Limited to headlines, the history of the exclusionary rule pertaining
to searches and seizures can be told in four cases.3 A dictum in Boyd v.
8 Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT.
REv. 1; Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NxB. L. Rv. 185 (1961).
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United States4 suggested for the first time that evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment should be inadmissible in court.
After being ignored for thirty years, that suggestion became law in
the federal courts in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.5 In 1949 the
fourth amendment right to immunity from unreasonable search and
seizure was recognized as applicable to state as well as to federal action
in Wolf v. Colorado,6 but the Court declined to impose the exclusionary rule as a required method of enforcement. Finally, in Mapp v.
Ohio,7 decided in 1961, the Court imposed the exclusionary rule on

the states, holding that the failure to exclude evidence that state
officers had obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure violated
the defendant's rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Two types of justifications have been urged for the exclusionary
rule, one normative and one factual. The normative justification is
the evil of government participation in illegal conduct. The factual
justification lies in the assertion that excluding evidence will reduce
violations of the search and seizure rules. This result is supposed to
follow in the short term from deterrence and in the long term from
education. The exclusion of evidence obtained by an illegal search or
seizure is expected to have the relatively immediate effect of deterring
law enforcement officials from such improper behavior. In addition,
by stressing the seriousness of society's commitment to observing the
search and seizure rules, the exclusionary rule is expected to invoke
the moral and educative force of the law and thus to have the long
term effect of encouraging greater conformity.
The normative reasons concern the impropriety of the lawgiver's
forbidding conduct on the one hand and at the same time participating in the forbidden conduct by acquiring and using the resulting
evidence.8 Justices Brandeis and Holmes gave the -leading expressions
of this view in arguing for the exclusion of illegally obtained wiretap
evidence in their notable dissents in Olmstead v. United States.9 Justice Holmes declared that he could attach no importance to the Government's expression of disapproval if it knowingly accepted and paid
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7 567 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 894 (1914).
9 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4
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for the fruits of the illegality. He thought it better for some criminals
to escape than for the government to "play an ignoble part."'1 Justice
Brandeis also spoke in moralistic terms of the need to "preserve the
judicial process from contamination," but he added the pragmatic
argument that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded to
maintain respect for law and to promote confidence in the administration of justice. "If the Government becomes a law-breaker," he declared, in a much quoted passage, "it breeds contempt for law; . . . it
invites anarchy."" More recently, the Supreme Court has declared
that "[c]ourts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not
be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions."' 2 In other words, the government ought not be permitted
to profit from its own wrong.
Although the normative justification that the Supreme Court has
referred to as the "imperative of judicial integrity"'13 continues to
appear in the rhetoric of Supreme Court decisions, it is doubtful that
this argument decides cases. Despite bold pronouncements about not
being a "party to lawless invasions," federal courts have not yet been
forbidden from entering a valid judgment of conviction against a
defendant who was brought before the court by illegal means such as
kidnapping, arrest without probable cause, or arrest upon a warrant
that was illegal or insufficient. 14 Moreover, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is
necessary for "judicial integrity" when no such rule is observed in
other common law jurisdictions such as England and Canada, 15 whose
courts are otherwise regarded as models of judicial decorum and
fairness.
When the Supreme Court has had to make decisions on the scope
of the exclusionary rule, its opinion has usually stressed and its reasonio Id. at 470.
11 Id. at 484-5. Professor Francis A. Allen gave modem voice to this argument by suggesting that "perhaps it may be urged that any process of law which sanctions the
imposition of penalties upon an individual through the utilization of the fruits of official
lawlessness tends to the destruction, not only of the rights of privacy, but of the whole
system of restraints on the exercise of the public force which would seem to be inherent
in the concept of civil liberty." Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 20 (1950).
12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
13 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
14 Ker v. Illinois, 119 US. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Stallings
v. Splain, 253 US. 339, 343 (1920); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1927).
15 See generally Martin, The Exclusionary Rule under Foreign Law-Canada, 52 J.
Crar. L.C. & P.S. 271 (1961); Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign LawEngland, 52 J. CimU. L.C. & P.S. 272 (1961).
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ing seems to have been dictated by the factual considerations of deter-rence rather than the normative arguments of judicial integrity. Thus,
in Elkins v. United States,16 where the Court decided that evidence
obtained in an illegal search by state officers must be excluded in a
federal criminal trial, the Court gave this explanation of the exclusionary rule: "Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it."' 17 The discursive prevailing opinion in
Mapp v. Ohio 8 quoted the Elkins statement and otherwise characterized the exclusionary rule as a "deterrent safeguard," but the decision
does not clearly identify the primary basis for the rule because Justice
Black's reliance on a self-incrimination theory split the majority on
20
this question. 19 These doubts were resolved in Linkletter v. Walker,
where the Court decided that Mapp should not be given retrospective
effect. Explaining that "the purpose [of the Mapp decision] was to
deter the lawless action of the police," the Court reasoned that this
purpose "will not at this late date be served by the wholesale release
'21
of the guilty victims."
Deterrence was also the crucial factor in the Court's decisions on
whether the new rules on interrogation warnings and lineup formalities should have retrospective application. 22 Thus, in its most recent
retroactivity decision, the Court held that the new requirements were
binding only on lineups that occurred after the Wade decision. 23 By
fixing the effective date in terms of the police conduct rather than in
terms of the time at which the trial court took its action in the matter,
the Court has impliedly rejected the theory of "judicial integrity" and
identified the exclusionary rule's primary purpose as that of con16 364 U.S. at 222.
17 Id. at 217.
18 367 U.S. at 648, 656, 676 (1961).
19 Allen, supra note 3, at 25. A federal circuit court of appeals recently applied the
Mapp precedent and rejected the judicial integrity rationale in a case in which Phillipine officers had obtained evidence by means that violated Phillipine law and that would
have violated fourth amendment rights if obtained by United States officers. Relying on
the fact that United States officers were not involved, the court upheld denial of the
motion to suppress by a federal district court. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 960 (1969).
?0 881 U.S. 618 (1965). See Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search
and Seizure, 84 U. CHi. L. REv. 842, 852 (1967), which discusses the various bases for the
exclusionary rule and concludes that Linkletter "accepted a general deterrence rationale
21 881 U.S. at 637.

22 Johnson v. New Jersey, 884 U.S. 719 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 298 (1967).
The underlying decisions, Miranda and Wade, are cited in note 1 supra.
23 Stovall v. Denno, 888 U.S. 298 (1967).
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trolling police behavior. 24 Finally, in an opinion concerning the retroactivity of its decision applying the self-incrimination privilege to the
states, the Supreme Court stated that deterrence was the "single and
25
distinct" purpose of the exclusionary rule.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the principal current argument for the exclusionary rule is a factual one: exclusion of
evidence obtained by illegal means will deter law enforcement officials
from the illegal behavior.26 "It is a logical enough theory, impregnable
24 Two authorities have urged that the renewed emphasis this gives to the factor
of police reliance means that the retroactivity of all the Court's prospective rulings in
the criminal procedure area will now be measured from the date of the police conduct.
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U.L. RFv. 1,
17 (1969); Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition,
1969 Sup. CT. R.v. 155, 184.
The rationale for the exclusionary rule is less clear in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85 (1963), where the Court held that a state could treat the admission of illegally
obtained evidence as harmless error where there was no reasonable possibility that it had
contributed to the defendant's conviction. This result is at odds with the logical requirements of either the "judicial integrity" or "deterrence" justifications for the rule.
It is perhaps best understood as indicative of judicial ambivalence about the exclusionary
rule itself. For similar opinions invoking the harmless error rule and exhibiting similar
uncertainty about the rationale of the exclusionary rule in this context, see People v.
Parkham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963) (Traynor, J.); cases
cited in Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 128 (1968).
25 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966). See also Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). "ITjhe raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule is the
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
deterrence of lawless law enforcement.
Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 334.
In times past the exclusionary rule has been described as giving a defendant a personal
right not to be convicted by means of illegally obtained evidence. Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 47-48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
633 (1886); Allen, supra note 3, at 35. It has also been said to be based on a "personal
incrimination theory" whereby it was a violation of the fifth amendment to convict a
person on the basis of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. Comment,
supra note 20, at 347-50. And the rule has been explained in terms of requiring
exclusion of the evidence as a kind of compensatory adjustment for the illegal invasion
of the defendant's rights. Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58
YALE L.J. 144, 153-4 (1948). All of these alternative explanations have now been discredited. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 229 (1969) (exclusionary rule "deemed
necessary to protect the rights of all citizens, not merely the citizen on trial"); Hill,
The Bill of Rights and -the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLus. L. REv. 181, 183 n.14 (1969);
Comment, supra note 20, at 352-3. Judge Friendly has stated that the defendant is
allowed to exclude evidence "not primarily to vindicate his right of privacy, since the
benefit received is wholly disproportionate to the wrong suffered," but to promote the
security of citizens generally. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951 (1965). Justice Traynor has declared that "the
objective of the exclusionary rule is certainly not to compensate the defendant for the
past wrong done to him .... " Traynor, supra, at 335.
26 "[Tjhe ultimate test of the exclusionary rules is whether they deter police officials
from engaging in the objectionable practices." Allen, Due Process and State Criminal
Procedures:Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 34 (1953).
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in the library." 27 But a factually based rule that is probably the most
important constitutional device for supervising criminal proceedings
in state courts 28 should have a more secure foundation than a theory
that has never been tested. Yet today, more than fifty years after the
exclusionary rule was adopted for the federal courts and almost a
decade after it was imposed upon the state courts, there is still no
convincing evidence to verify the factual premise of deterrence
upon which the rule is based or to determine the limits of its effectiveness. 29 Eminent judges, respected for their devotion to civil liberties, have voiced disapproval of the rule.30 Recent events in the United
States Supreme Court suggest the possibility of modification. Plainly,
it is time that the factual premises of the exclusionary rule were subjected to scrutiny.
II.

EVALUATIONS OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES

In adopting the exclusionary rule for federal courts the Weeks
Court indulged two assumptions: (1) that exclusion of evidence would
discourage illegal behavior, and (2) that there was no feasible alternative for controlling such behavior.3 ' Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have vacillated between conceding ignorance of these essential
facts and simply asserting them. None has tendered anything remotely
approaching evidence.
27 Waite, Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv. 679,
685 (1944).
28 Writing a year after the case was decided, a Pennsylvania prosecutor stated that
Mapp v. Ohio "is the most significant event in criminal law since the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment." Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora'sProblems for the Prosecutor,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 4 (1962).
29 LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Mimi. L. REv. 987, 1003 (1965); Allen, supra
note 3, at 32-40.
30 Friendly, supra note 25, at 951-4; Schaefer, supra note 24, at 14. Recent academic
criticism is sparse but growing. N. MoRms & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE
To CRIME CONTROL 101 (1969); F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON & C. SOWLE, CASES AND COMENS
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION 1-84 (3d ed. 1968); Burns, Mapp v.
Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. RaV. 80 (1969); Waite, supra note 27.
The Inbau, Thompson & Sowle book was a particularly valuable source in the preparation of this paper.
31 "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution."
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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A. Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule
This section will briefly review various methods that have been
suggested for controlling illegal behavior by law enforcement personnel. Although an inquiry into the effectiveness of each method is
beyond the scope of this article, it is important to have some general
impressions on the question. The inappropriateness of an important
federal constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure without a clearly available federal remedy was surely a persuasive factor in the Supreme Court's eventual decision to impose the
exclusionary rule. 32 It is at least equally important today that there

be an effective mechanism for redress of grievances against the police. 33
Thus far, no method of enforcing constitutional guarantees and
controls over illegal searches and seizures has demonstrated its effectiveness in practice. 34 Although the law enforcement conduct involved
in an improper search and seizure often constitutes a crime, the criminal law is not an effective instrument of control.3 5 Perhaps this is
because in most cases involving police officers prosecutors will not
prosecute and juries will not convict. An improper search and seizure
is likewise a common law tort, but tort liability enforced by the
aggrieved plaintiff is not thought to be an effective control because
juries will be unwilling to find significant damages against police
officers, especially in favor of a plaintiff who was an accused or convicted criminal.3 6 In addition, a judgment may not be collectible from
the officer because of his inability to pay or from the employing gov37
ernment unit because of sovereign immunity or other legal barrier.
32 Allen, supra note 3, at 2-20.
33 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvIL DISORDERS 162-3 (1968).
34 See generally W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY

411-27 (1965); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 193-207 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE]; authorities cited in Kamisar, Wolf & Lustig, Ten Years Later:

Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts,43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1150 n.238 (1959).
35 Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REV.
621 (1955).
36 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv.
493 (1955). See generally Symposium on Police Tort Liability, 16 CLL'v.-MAR. L. REV.
397-454 (1967).
37 Several authorities have proposed legislation to impose liability on political subdivisions whose officers committed an offense. 3 K.C. DAvIs, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 25.17, 26.03 (1958); Mathes &, Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity
for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889 (1965); Barrett, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L.
REV. 565, 579 (1955). A few states provide indemnity for officers held liable for damages
for injuries inflicted while they are engaged in the performance of their duties. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 1-4-5 & 1-4-6 (1969). Thus far there is no showing that either
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The federal statutory cause of action under the Civil Rights Act,
section 1983, is another possibility that has not been demonstrated to
be an effective deterrent of illegal behavior.38 Jury reluctance and the
insufficient measure of damages are probably the outstanding difficulties. There are some omens of change in these areas,3 9 but an
effective tort remedy is still unrealized.
All law enforcement agencies have some internal administrative
review and discipline for officers who violate laws or department regulations, but interested outsiders generally distrust the objectivity of
such procedures. Internal review is not looked upon as an effective
mechanism for insuring adherence to the constitutional and statutory
rights of those suspected of crime. An outside review body with disciplinary powers, such as a civilian review board or an ombudsman,
seems to be a better prospect in theory. Unfortunately, there is virtually no United States experience with an ombudsman in this role,
and the civilian review boards that have operated in the past few years
have been recommending bodies, with little or no power of decision
and enforcement. 40 Consequently, there is insufficient experience to
determine whether either of these alternatives could effectively control police behavior. Another recent suggestion would have courts
enforce individual rights by citing offending law enforcement officers
for contempt of court,41 but thus far there has been virtually no ex-

perience with this remedy.
B.

The Deterrent Effect of the Exclusionary Rule
In Irvine v. California,42 Justice Jackson achieved a degree of candor
still unequalled by declaring:
What actual experience teaches we really do not know. Our
cases evidence the fact that the federal rule of exclusion and
our reversal of conviction for its violation are not sanctions
which put an end to illegal search and seizure by federal
officers. .

.

. There is no reliable evidence known to us that

inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence suffer
enlarged liability or indemnity has realized the expectation that government agencies
exposed to this prospect of liability would take steps to minimize their risk by effectively
reducing police misbehavior.
38 The leading case in search and seizure is Monroe v. rape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
39 See text accompanying note 148 infra.
40 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 200-4.
41 Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief From Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104;
Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78
YALE L.J. 143 (1968); Comment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. RZv. 104 (1970).
42 347 U.S. 128, 135-7 (1954).
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less from lawless searches and seizures than those of states
that admit it.
Similarly, in Elkins v. United States,43 Justice Stewart conceded that
"[e]mpirical statistics are not available" to show that the exclusionary
rule reduces the incidence of lawless searches and seizures. Justice
Clark's opinion in Mapp v. Ohio44 asserts that the exclusionary rule

deters police from violating constitutional guarantees by removing the
incentive to disregard them, and that the alternative remedies have
been "worthless and futile." But the opinion offers no evidence to
substantiate either assertion. In fact, M1fapp reversed the Wolf case
and imposed the exclusionary rule on more than a score of states even
though the question was not raised in the briefs and was only touched
45
on tangentially in the oral argument.
At the time of the Mapp decision, the sum total of published empirical evidence on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule consisted of eleven responses to Justice Murphy's inquiries about the
extent of police training in areas with and without the exclusionary
rule, a student comment suggesting that the rule did not deter unlawful methods in the enforcement of gambling laws in Chicago in 1950,
and some commentary aimed at refuting the contention that the exclusionary rule had crippled law enforcement in areas where it had been
adopted. All of this evidence is discussed in the next section. 46
Once the Supreme Court invoked its authority to make the exclusionary rule a matter of constitutional imperative, it took little time
for the Court's familiarity with the rule to become certainty as to its
deterrent effect. In Linkletter v. Walker,47 Justice Clark's opinion
referred to the exclusionary rule as "the only effective deterrent
against lawless police action." Chief Justice Warren repeated that
extravagant praise in Terry v. Ohio,48 and even suggested that the

heroic proportions of the rule rose out of something more than
assertion:
[I]ts major thrust is a deterrent one [citing Linkletter v.
Walker], and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context. .... 49
43 864 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
44 367 U.S. 643, 652, 656 (1961).
45 Id. at 676.
46

See text accompanying notes 65, 72 & 79 infra.

47 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
48 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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Justice Roger Traynor was equally enthusiastic in People v. Cahan,50
which adopted the exclusionary rule for California. His influential
opinion asserts that adoption of the excliisionary rule "will discourage" illegal searches and seizures, and that it "will also arouse public
opinion as a deterrent to . . .law enforcement officers who allow
criminals to escape by pursuing them in lawless ways."' 51
Informed observers other than the United States Supreme Court
have uniformly agreed that presently available alternatives for deterring police misconduct are ineffective. 52 But these authorities have
generally been more guarded than the Supreme Court in their characterization of the exclusionary rule's potential for deterrence. In a 1950
article Francis A. Allen wrote:
One seeking to discover the actual consequences of the exclusionary rule in protecting individual rights of privacy and
its effects upon the process of law enforcement cannot fail to
be impressed by the paucity of empirical evidence upon
which anything more than highly tentative conclusions may
be based. Data to supply adequate answers to even elementary questions is largely non-existent. 53
Despite the lack of data, Professor Allen offered the opinion that the
rule had "substantial regulative effect," because it subjected the
individual officer "to the pressure of those charged with making an
efficient record of criminal convictions to avoid conduct which imperils successful prosecution." He also urged that the "regulative
effect of public opinion . . . is more likely to become a reality where
the consequence of an official invasion of privacy may be to deprive
the state of power to secure the conviction of a serious offender."54
Edward L. Barrett, Jr. was cautious in his declaration that "[t]he
factual question regarding the effectiveness of the rule cannot be
answered in any satisfactory fashion without detailed field studies of
the actual operations of law enforcement officials and the effect upon
them of the exclusionary rule."55
Writing while a judge of the court of appeals, Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger took a negative view of the deterrent capacity of the exclusionary rule, though he was equally obscure about the factual basis
for his conclusion:
44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
Id. at 448-9, 282 P.2d at 913-4.
See authorities cited notes 34-41 supra.
Allen, supra note 11, at 16-17.
54 Id. at 20.
55 Barrett, supra note 37, at 584.
50
51
52
53
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Some of the most recent cases in the Supreme Court reveal,
almost plaintively, an unspoken hope that if judges say often
and firmly that-deterrence is the purpose, police will finally
take notice and be deterred. As I see it, a fair conclusion is
that the record does not support a claim that police conduct
has been substantially affected by the suppression of the
prosecution's evidence ....
I suggest that the notion that suppression of evidence in a
given case effectively deters the future action of the particular policeman or of policemen generally was never more
than wishful thinking on the part of the courts. 56
Monrad Paulsen tenders the cautious appraisal that the exclusionary
rule "is the best we have,"57 and that it is "the most effective remedy
we possess to deter police lawlessness."5 Nevertheless, he asserts that
"there are reasons to believe that the exclusionary rule has an important practical influence," 59 and that the rule "creates a genuine
incentive for police departments to educate their members in the
constitutional rights of suspected persons." 60
Yale Kamisar, another enthusiast for the exclusionary rule, treats
the question of the factual basis for the rule in this manner:
The fact that there is little agreement and little evidence that
the exclusionary rule does deter police lawlessness is much
less significant, I think, than the fact that there is much
agreement and much evidence that all other existing alternatives do not. 61
Professor Kamisar is obviously too careful a thinker to be suggesting
that the absence of deterrent effect by any of the existing alternatives
establishes the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. That there is
no alternative cure for cancer does not prove the effectiveness of
62
treatment by the "expressed juice of the woolly-headed thistle."
56 Burger, Who Will Watch The Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1964).
57 Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 74 (1957).
58 Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CPmm. L.C. &

P.S. 255, 257 (1961).
59 Id. at 260.
00 Paulsen, supra note 57, at 74.
61 Kamisar, supra note 84, at 1150.
62 Recommended in Prudence Smith's Modern American Cookery of 1831 according to
J. FutNAs, THE AMERICANS 338 (1969).
If the exclusionary rule does have a measurable deterrent effect, then the lack of

feasible alternatives helps to justify the use of the rule even though it has undesirable
side effects. But if no positive case can be made for the deterrent effect of the rule,
then the lack of feasible alternatives adds nothing to the case. "[I]n the final analysis,
the justification for the imposition of the rule on the reluctant states must rest on the
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Kamisar is merely saying what the Supreme Court and a considerable
number of scholars have said over and over again, 68 that in the
absence of any better alternative, we are willing to take the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule solely on the basis of assumption.
In sum, the rhetoric concerning the factual basis for the exclusionary rule amounts to no more than "fig-leaf phrases used to cover
naked ignorance."64
III.

ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE

This section examines both previously published and newly compiled evidence on 'the effect of the exclusionary rule pertaining to
search and seizure on the criminal justice system, particularly on law
enforcement personnel. Three research methods are represented in
this data. The before-after method compares the conduct of law enforcement officers or the operation of the criminal justice system
before and after adoption of the exclusionary rule. The multiple-area
method compares the conduct of law enforcement officers or the
operation of the criminal justice system in a jurisdiction that has the
exclusionary rule with a jurisdiction that does not. These first two
methods compare the effect of the rule at different times or in different jurisdictions. The third method, field observation, tries to
determine the effect of the rule in a single area during a single period
of time, such as by drawing inferences from the proportion of motions to suppress that are granted in a particular crime. The information has been obtained from a variety of sources including questionnaires, criminal justice system statistics and observation. The data is
grouped according to those sources.
A.

Questionnaire Results

The first recorded attempt to test empirically the factual assumptions underlying the exclusionary rule was Justice Murphy's questionaffirmative case that can be made for the rule, not on the inefficacy of the tort suit,
police discipline, or whatever else may be suggested as a substitute." Allen, supra note
3, at 33 n.172.
63 Justice Traynor is a notable example: "We have been compelled to reach that

conclusion [adopting the exclusionary rule] because other remedies have completely failed
to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers ....
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955); "police methods of obtaining
evidence were not being deterred in any other way. . . . [There was no recourse
but to the exclusionary rule." Traynor, supra note 25, at 322, 324.
64 To borrow a phrase Will Durant applied to the incautious verbiage of philosophy.
W. DuRANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 101 (1926).
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naire, described in his dissent in Wolf v. Colorado.6 5 Randomly selecting 38 large cities, he sent written inquiries about the extent of police
training in the rules of search and seizure. He received 26 replies, but
his opinion characterized only 11 of these. Table 1 summarizes the
results.
TABLE 1
POLICE TRAINING IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Rur.s IN 11 Crrms IN 1949
Extent of
Police Training

In Cities in States
without
with
the Exclusionary Rule

Negligible
Extensive

1
5

4
1

Total

6

5

Justice Murphy concluded: "The contrast between states with the
federal rule and those without it is thus a positive demonstration of
its efficacy." 66 While Justice Murphy is to be praised for attempting to
investigate what his fellow judges have generally been willing to take
on assumption, it is regrettable that he failed to disclose the nature of
all the replies, and that he so obviously overstated the conclusion to be
drawn from his data. Even if one ignored the smallness of the sample
and conceded that this survey showed more police training in jurisdictions with the exclusionary rule, police training is only the first step.
The ultimate inquiry is whether the training affects police behavior.
A wider range of opinion about police training and other effects of
the exclusionary rule was elicited by Stuart S. Nagel's 1963 questionnaire concerning the Mapp decision. These inquiries were mailed to
250 persons, five in each state. The recipients, randomly chosen in
their individual categories, consisted of a police chief, a prosecuting
attorney, a judge, a defense attorney and an American Civil Liberties
Union official. Questionnaires were returned by 113 recipients (45%),
representing 47 states and consisting of roughly equal proportions of
the five categories. Nagel's hypothesis was that between 1960 and 1963
the 24 states that had been forced to adopt the exclusionary rule (by
the 1961 Mapp decision) would have undergone more changes of
various kinds relevant to the rule than the 23 states that had been
applying an exclusionary rule before Mapp. The Table 2 summary of
the questionnaire returns, which of course merely represents an
65 338 US. 25, 44-46 (1949).

e6 Id. at 46.
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accumulation of the opinions of the persons questioned, supports
67
Nagel's hypothesis.
TABLE 2
OPINIONS ON EFFECr OF ExcLusIoNARY RULE ON
POLICE BEHAVIOR, 1960 To 1963
Answers Given by Respondents in States which:
Already had the
Exclusionary Rule
Type of Change from
1960 to 1963
Police Adherence to
Legality in Searches
Police Educational Efforts
Concerning Legality in
Searches
Police Effectiveness in
Searches

in 1961
Decrease
Increase

Were forced to Adopt
the Exclusionary Rule
in 1961
Decrease

Increase

9

57

4

75

0

77

0

87

9

26

43

17

* 100% = Per cent of decrease plus per cent of increase plus per cent of those states

which reported "no change." E.g., the changes in police adherence to legality in searches
in states that already had the exclusionary rule were 9% decrease, 57% increase and 34%
no change.

This data shows a comparatively larger increase in adherence to legal
standards and in educational efforts in those states that had just been
compelled to adopt the exclusionary rule. But it also shows a comparatively larger decrease in the effectiveness of the police in these
states.
In other opinion evidence, individual law enforcement personnel
67 Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV.
283, 283-6. Other subjects covered in the questionnaire or treated in the article, such as
the frequency of raising search and seizure subjects (as measured by the number of
headnotes in the West Digest), possible effects as measured by state crime statistics, and
questions about the declarant's attitude toward the exclusionary rule, are omitted here
because the data they yield are not considered significant.
A somewhat similar questionnaire returned by 90 police chiefs, sheriffs, trial judges,
prosecutors and defense counsel in North Carolina showed that about three-quarters felt
that the exclusion of evidence was an effective way to reduce the number of illegal
searches. Katz, Supreme Court and the State: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North
Carolina,45 N.C.L. RFv. 119 (1966).
A questionnaire answered by 30 police chiefs and sheriffs in Colorado shows that only
20% of them felt that the decision making illegally obtained evidence inadmissible would
"substantially" affect their departments' search and seizure practice. The other returns
stated that it would affect their practices only "slightly" (47%) or "not at all" (33%).
Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34
RocKY MT. L. REv. 150, 176 (1962). It was unclear whether the latter answers reflected a
high degree of legality preceding Mapp or a low degree of conformity after.
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and outside observers have expressed the view that imposition of the
exclusionary rule has resulted in increased police awareness and
observance of search and seizure rules. 68
B. Motions to Suppress
Court statistics show the astonishing extent to which the exclusion
of evidence-as measured by the incidence of motions to suppress-is
concentrated in a few crimes. Table 3 includes all motions to suppress, not just those involving searches and seizures, but knowledgeable observers in Chicago and the District of Columbia confirm that
search and seizure issues account for an overwhelming proportion of
these motions.
Table 3 shows that over 50 per cent of the motions to suppress in
Chicago and the District were filed in cases involving narcotics and
weapons, even though these crimes accounted for a comparatively
small proportion of the total number of persons held for prosecution.6 9
(The nationwide figures show that only 2 per cent of the total number
of persons held for prosecution were charged with weapons or narcotics offenses.) In Chicago an additional 26 per cent of the motions
to suppress were filed in gambling cases, which account for only 1 per
cent of the national total of persons held for prosecution. It may be
argued that the low incidence of motions to suppress in some crime
categories signifies that the exclusionary rule is extraordinarily effective in those categories. A more likely explanation is that the
68 Kamisar, supra note 34, at 1145-58; Paulsen, supra note 58, at 263. Though it has
been said that such individual observations "fulfill the fondest hopes and expectations
of proponents of the exclusionary rule," Kamisar, supra note 34, at 1158, they are insufficient to constitute persuasive empirical evidence of the deterrent capacity of the rule.
69 For a discussion of important differences in the time and manner in which motions
to suppress are litigated in Chicago and the District, see text following note 76 infra.
The District's felony motions to suppress are also concentrated, though the mixture of
offenses is different. The 142 motions to suppress disposed of in felony cases in 1965 were
grouped as follows:
Distributionof Motions to
%
Suppress in Felony Cases
Robbery, burglary and other
42
property offenses
18
Narcotics
15
Violence against person
10
Gambling
6
Weapons
4
White-collar crimes
5
All other
TOTAL

100

(142)
Computed from data in Table 7 infra.
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AMONG VARIOUS
CRIM S IN CHICAGO AND DIsTcr

Offense
Narcotics
Weapons
Gambling
Disorderly Conduct
Theft, Burglary,
Receiving and Other
Property Offenses
Assault
Two or More of
Above Crimes
All Other Crimes
Total

OF COLUMBIA,

1969-70

Proportion of Total Motions
to Suppress
_Held
to___uppress
District of
Chicago
Columbia

Proportion of
Total Persons
for
Prosecution
(United States)

24
28
26
11

85
26
4
*

1
1
1
10

4

19
1

15
6

*

15b

7a
100
(649 motions
in 12 court days)

*
100
(69 motions
in 2 months)

66
100
(2.3 million
persons)

* Signifies less than .5%.
a No other category exceeded 2%.
b Consists of motions in cases involving two or more types of charges: property and
narcotics, 4%; property and weapons, 3%; property and assault, 3%; other combinations,
5%.
Source: Chicago data for misdemeanors and preliminary hearings in felonies, compiled
from examination of court records in all 14 branches of the First District of the Municipal Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County hearing criminal cases for 12
sample days in 1969: Jan. 15, Feb. 14, March 13, Apr. 15, May 15, June 16, July 15, Aug.
15, Sept. 15, Oct. 15, Nov. 13, and Dec. 15. District of Columbia data for misdemeanors
only, compiled from examination of court records in motions court of Court of General
Sessions for every motion day in March and April, 1970. Data in both areas include only
those motions disposed of by grant or denial during the period. United States data computed from FFDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 109 (1967).

frequency of motions to suppress is a function of the relative importance, in the prosecution of a particular type of crime, of evidence that
70
is obtained by means that can reasonably be challenged as improper.
70 Narcotics, weapons, and gambling are all crimes where one piece of physical evidence
-generally obtained from the person or premises of the accused-is vital to the prosecution. This is not true of offenses such as auto theft or assault, which also rank high in
the number of reported crimes but rarely involve a motion to suppress. The property
offenses are mixed. Some, like receiving stolen property, possession of burglary tools and
a theft charge based on possession, are likely to involve questions of the legality of search
and seizure, whereas others are not. Of course a motion to suppress may also challenge an
identification or the use of a statement taken from the accused, and in this manner
motions to suppress may figure in criminal charges that seldom involve questions of
search and seizure.
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If so, then the law enforcement conduct that is supposed to be deterred
by the exclusionary rule will probably be concentrated in the enforcement of those few crimes where motions to suppress are most
numerous. Whether or not one accepts that hypothesis, the unequal
distribution of motions to suppress among various crime categories
should at least make one wary of attempts to use overall crime statistics as an index of the effect of the exclusionary rule.
Within the various crimes where motions to suppress are concentrated, there are wide variations in the proportion of cases where
there is a motion to suppress and in the proportion of motions granted.
These variations are direct evidence of the effect of the exclusionary
rule on the criminal justice system, and they may also provide indirect evidence on the extent of its deterrent effect on the police.
The most extensive empirical inquiry preceding the decision in
Mapp v. Ohio was a student study 7l of motions to suppress during
1950 in the branch of the Chicago Municipal Court that handled all
gambling and narcotics violations and some weapons charges. Table 4
contains the data from this student study. Table 5 contains the equivalent data for 1969, when the same cases were divided between two
branches of the Circuit Court. In each table the figures represent
motions during preliminary hearings of felonies and trials of misdemeanors. These are not before-after comparisons, since Illinois
adopted the exclusionary rule long before 1950, and it was in effect
during the entire period covered by these tables.
Table 4 shows that 77 per cent of the defendants in gambling cases
in 1950 moved to suppress, and that 99 per cent of these motions were
granted. In no case was a conviction secured after the suppression of
evidence. Consequently, the motion to suppress was the dispositive
event for 76 per cent of the defendants charged with gambling offenses in Chicago in 1950. The student authors concluded that their
study had shown that as to gambling cases:
[T]he rule has failed to deter any substantial number of
illegal searches. . . . These figures

. . .

may indicate that

the exclusionary rule is most effective in discouraging illegal
searches in cases involving serious offenses, where conviction
is important. Conversely, where the police believe that a
policy of harassment is an effective means of law enforcement, the exclusionary rule will not deter their use of
unlawful methods72
71 Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the ConstitutionalRight of
Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493, 498 (1952).

72 Id. at 497-8. This conclusion is reinforced by data from another jurisdiction, where
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TABLE 4
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN GAMBLING, WEAPONS AND
NARCOTICS CASES IN BRANCH 27 OF THE

MUNICIPAL COURT OF CmCACO, 1950

Offense
Gambling
Policy (numbers)
Keeper of
Gaming House
City Gambling
Charges*

No. of
Defendants

Defendants
with Motion
to Suppress
(a)

Motions
Granted
(b)

Defendants
with Motion
Granted
(a) x (b)

(461)
(2,133)

81
73

100
98

81
71

(791)

88

99

87

(2,463)

75

99

74

All Gambling Offenses
Narcotics
Carrying Concealed
Weapons

(5,848)
(288)

77
19

99
100

76
19

(513)

28

91

25

All Offenses Above

(6,649)

70

98

69

* Covers such charges as inmate of a gambling house; violations always occurred in
conjunction with other gambling offenses.

The 1969 figures for gambling offenses are lower than those for
1950, but are still high by comparison with other crimes. There were
motions to suppress in 52 per cent of the gambling cases and 86 per
cent were granted. Since the charges were immediately dismissed in
every case where a motion to suppress was granted, the motion to
suppress was the dispositive event in 45 per cent of the gambling
cases in Chicago in 1969. Although somewhat lower than in 1950,
that total is still sufficiently high to cast serious doubt upon the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule to deter illegal searches and
seizures in the enforcement of gambling laws in Chicago.
This does not prove that the exclusionary rule has no deterrent
effect in gambling cases. The rule may have some effect in those cases
where motions are denied, and it may also affect enforcement activities
that do not result in prosecutions. But the figures at least show that
the exclusionary rule has not been effective in persuading the Chicago
there were 80 raids on alleged gambling operations during a six-month period, resulting
in 580 arrests, but not more than 25 of these persons were prosecuted. Goldstein, Police
Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 584 n.89 (1960). During the same period, criminal
prosecutions were initiated against only 75 of 3,000 women arrested for prostitution. For
a discussion of why the exdusionary rule is unlikely to be a significant deterrent
upon police conduct in gambling and prostitution, see W. LAFAVE, supra note 84, at chs.
22, 24.
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TABLE 5
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN GAMBLING, WEAPONS AND
NAconcs CAsES IN BRANCHEs 27 AND 57 OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
IN CmICAGO FOR 12 SAMPLE DAYS IN 1969

Offense
Gambling
Keeper of Gaming House
City Gambling Charges

No. of
Defendants
(86)
(38)
(188)

Defendants
with Motion
to Suppress
(a)
80
53
39

Motions
Granted
(b)
74
85
97

Defendants
with Motion
to Suppress
Granted
(a) x (b)
59
45
38

All Gambling Offenses
Narcotics
Carrying Concealed Weapons

(312)
(457)
(188)

52
34
36

86
97
68

45
33
24

All Offenses Above

(957)

40

87

35

Same source and sample days as listed in Table 3. The 649 total motions shown in
Table 3 for the whole Circuit Court is composed of the 386 motions shown above (40%
of 957), 141 other motions to suppress in Branches 27 and 57 (including 65 in gun
registration and city gun cases, 52 in disorderly conduct, 6 in assault and 4 in theft),
and 122 motions in all other branches of the Circuit Court. The subject-matter breakdown appears in Table 3.

police to observe the search and seizure rules in anywhere near as
high a proportion of cases as they are able. If the Chicago police were
serious about observing the search and seizure law in gambling cases
they should be able to observe the rules with enough consistency that
no more than a small fraction of charges would be dismissed after the
granting of a motion to suppress.
The same may be said of narcotics and weapons cases, though these
figures are somewhat lower than those for gambling. In 1950 the
number of narcotics defendants who were dismissed after a motion to
suppress was a comparatively low 19 per cent. In 1969 there were
about 50 times as many narcotics cases (457 for 12 sample days in 1969
compared with 288 for a whole year in 1950), and the number disposed of by motions to suppress had climbed to 33 per cent.73 The
1950 and 1969 figures for defendants charged with carrying a concealed weapon are practically identical, 25 and 24 per cent, respectively. The narcotics and weapons figures of 33 and 24 per cent of
defendants being released because of illegally obtained evidence seem
73 Similarly, a 1964 sample of 70 Chicago narcotics cases showed motions to suppress
in 29 cases, with 22 of these granted, for a total disposition by motion to suppress of
31 per cent. D. OAKS & W. LamneAN, A CRIMINAL JUST= SYSTM AD THE INDIGENT:
A STUDY OF CmcAoo Am COOK COUNTY 88-89 (1968).
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considerably higher than would be necessary if the Chicago police were
really serious about observing the search and seizure rules.
Current data on all motions to suppress in the District of Columbia
provides an illuminating contrast. Tables 6 and 7 show the figures for
misdemeanors and felonies.
TABLE 6
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN MISDEMEANOR CASES,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS,
MARCH & APRIL, 1970

No. of Motions

No. Granted

Gambling
Narcotics
Weapons

3
24
18

0
6
3

Property Offenses

13

1

Assault
Combination of Above

1
10

0
4

Total

69

14
(20%)

Offense

Source: Same as Table 3. Includes all motions to suppress granted or denied during
period, but excludes motions continued or withdrawn. No data available on the number
of defendants charged with each crime or on the disposition of defendants for whom
the motion was granted.
TABLE 7
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN FELONY CASES,

DISTRIar

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Offense

No. of
Charges

Charges with
Motion to
Suppress
(a)

1965
Motions
Granted

(b)

Charges with
Motion
Granted
(a) x (b)

Gambling & Lottery

(119)

12

14

2

Narcotics

(109)

23

16

4

Weapons
Robbery, Burglary & Theft
Homicide, Rape & Assault
Fraud, Forgery, Counterfeiting
& Embezzlement
Other Crimes

(141)
(1,138)
(558)

6
5
4

2
8
27

1

(160)
(83)

3
8

0
0

All Offenses Above

(2,308)

6
(142)

13
(19)

1

1
(19)

Signifies less than .5%.
Source: Number of charges from tables prepared by staff of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, p. 1; figures on motions to suppress from
President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, unpublished computer
printouts, pp. 23-24. All data is in possession of Sylvia Bacon, Executive Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia.
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The figures on motions to suppress in Chicago and the District of
Columbia are in sharp contrast at every level. A few examples will
suffice. The per cent of gambling cases in which there is a motion to
suppress is 81 per cent for Chicago but 12 per cent for the comparable
felony in the District. In the felony of carrying concealed weapons,
there is a motion to suppress in 86 per cent of the cases in Chicago
but 6 per cent in the District. The per cent of motions granted in
narcotics offenses is 97 per cent in Chicago but 25 per cent for misdemeanors and 16 per cent for felonies in the District. The number of
defendants who have a motion to suppress granted in weapons and
narcotics cases is 24 and 33 per cent in Chicago but 1 and 4 per cent
for felonies in the District. On this last example the contrast is even
larger than the figures indicate, since all of the Chicago defendants
were dismissed when their motion was granted, whereas only about
half of the District felony cases were dismissed in this manner.7 4
An even more significant contrast between Chicago and the District
of Columbia is in the number of motions to suppress. When the totals
in Tables 5 through 7 are converted to monthly figures, Chicago has
about 1,140 motions to suppress per month and the District has
about 47. When these figures are adjusted for differences in the number
of reported arrests, Chicago has about two and one-half times more
motions to suppress in felonies and misdemeanors than the District of
Columbia.7
Such contrasts are clearly attributable to important differences in
the criminal justice systems of the two cities. These include differences
74 The manner of disposition of the 19 felony cases in which a motion to suppress
was granted (see Table 7) was as follows:

Offense

No. of
Motions
Granted

Disposition of Case
Dismissal
Other
Unknown

Gambling & Lottery
Narcotics
Weapons
Robbery, Burglary & Theft

2
4
2
5

1
3
2
2

2

1

Homicide, Rape & Assault

6

1

8

2

19

9

5

5

Totals

1
1

Source: Data furnished by Jean G. Taylor of the Institute for Defense Analyses in
Letter of May 5, 1970.
75 The Chicago total is 650 motions in felonies and misdemeanors for 12 sample days,
which is equivalent to 1140 for a month with 21 working days. The District's total
is 35 per month for misdemeanors (Table 6) and an average of 12 per month for felonies
(Table 7), for a total of 47 per month. Chicago reports 9 times more arrests under the
Uniform Crime Reporting Program (classes 1 through 26) than the District. Chicago Police
Annual Report, 1968, p. 17; Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C., Annual
Report, Fiscal 1969, p. 43.
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in the receptivity of judges to claims of illegal search and seizure and
differences in the structure of the system, as well as differences in
police behavior. Comparative data cannot be evaluated accurately
without taking account of these differences. The point is of enormous
importance, especially where the researcher plans to use multiple area
comparisons. It is important even for a proper evaluation of individual
data such as the inference to be drawn from the high per cent of
motions to suppress granted in. Chicago or the low per cent granted
in the District. A short summary of the important systemic differ76
ences between those two cities is appropriate for illustrative purposes.
In Chicago there is virtually no advance screening by the prosecutor. Felony and misdemeanor charges are specified by the police
without review by the prosecutor until' they come up for initial
hearing in one of the municipal branches of the Circuit Court. Here
there are numerous motions to suppress, dismissals, charge reductions
and other rearrangements. The misdemeanors are tried on the merits.
Preliminary hearings are held in the felonies, with bindovers going
on to the grand jury and disposition before a judge in the Criminal
Division. Motions to suppress are invariably made and disposed of
in the municipal branch and there are rarely any such motions after
felony indictments have gone on for trial or plea in the Criminal
Division. (In 12 sample days in 1969 there were 649 motions to sup77
press in the municipal branches and only 1 in the Criminal Division.)
In this system, the occasions for invoking the exclusionary rule are
litigated in open court, in advance of charge reductions or plea
bargaining.
District of Columbia prosecutors review all cases before they are
presented in court. A significant ynumber of charges-10 per cent is
the popular guess-are dropped ("no-papered") at this point for
various reasons including the prosecutor's conclusion that vital evidence would be suppressed.78 No motions to suppress are heard at the
76"The account of Chicago's system is based on the author's experience, largely reported
in D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, supra note 73, at chs. 1-4. See also McIntyre, A Study of
Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968). The
District of Columbia information is based on H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLTrAN COURT (Office of Criminal Justice, 1966) and on the author's observations and
conferences with several prosecutors in that city.
77 See Table 3. If a motion to suppress is granted in the municipal branch, the evidence
cannot be introduced in the Criminal Division. People ex rel. MacMillan v. Napoli, 35
Ill. 2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 489 (1966).
78 But cf. H. SUBIN, supra note 76, at 29-31, which shows no such reason among the
classification of reasons for no-papering. For a discussion of this use of the exclusionary
rule as a factor in the decision to charge, see F. MILLER, PROSECION: TxE DECIsION To
CHARCE A SusPEcT wrrH A CRIME 37-40 (1969).
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first court appearance or at the trial of misdemeanor charges, or at the
preliminary hearing of felonies. All felony motions are heard in the
district court, after indictment. Misdemeanor motions are calendared
and heard on notice not less than 5 days before trial. In this system
many, if not most, of the occasions for invoking the exclusionary rule
are eliminated by the prosecutor's advance screening. Consequently,
the low proportion of cases with motions to suppress and the low proportion of motions granted are in no way indicative of the impact
of illegal search and -seizure as a factor in the disposition of cases in
the District. That impact would appear only in a study of the extent
to which charges are no-papered by the prosecutor because of anticipated exclusion of vital evidence by a motion to suppress.
C. Arrest and Conviction
The relative accessibility of crime statistics has prompted their use
in comparisons of crime before and after the adoption of the exclusionary rule. After California adopted the exclusionary rule in
1955, law enforcement personnel used a few arrest and conviction
statistics to condemn the decision's supposed adverse effect upon law
enforcement and the crime rate. Yale Kamisar effectively refuted these
dire predictions, but made no attempt at a statistical evaluation of the
theory that the exclusionary rule discouraged illegality by the police.7 9
If the exclusionary rule does affect police behavior, then this might be
discernible in the rates of arrest or conviction. The totals for all
crimes are not likely to be revealing, but the number and rate of
arrests and convictions in selected offenses may provide evidence on
the effect of the exclusionary rule.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 contain comparative annual figures on arrests
and convictions in weapons, narcotics, and gambling offenses in Cincinnati over a period of five years before and six years after the
adoption of the exclusionary rule. 0 To provide added information for
79 Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53
J. CIaIr. L.C. & P.S. 171, 188-90 (1962); Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 462-7 (1964). Also effective as
rebuttal but of no positive force in demonstrating the deterrent capacity of the exclusionary rule is the so-called "pragmatic evidence" Justice Stewart cites in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), that the federal courts have operated under the
exclusionary rule for over half a century without disrupting the administration of
criminal justice or rendering the F.B.I. ineffective.
80 These offenses were chosen because Table 3 shows them to be the crimes most
likely to involve illegal enforcement activity. Cincinnati was chosen for illustrative
purposes because its annual police reports for the period are extraordinarily thorough
and detailed and apparently were kept on a consistent basis from year to year. Ohio is an
excellent jurisdiction to test the effect of Mapp since Mapp was a local case, and probably
received as much publicity in Ohio law enforcement circles as in those of any state.
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Weapons offenses include carrying and possession. In this and the next two Figures
arrests equal total persons charged by police plus persons released by police without
formal charges. Convictions are persons found or pleaded guilty, whether arrested in that
year or the previous one.
Source: Cincinnati Police, Annual Report of the Division of Police, 1956 through 1967,
Table 24. The assistance of University of Chicago Law School student, Katherine B.
Soffer, in the assembling of data for Figures 1 through 5 is gratefully acknowledged.

interpretive purposes, Figures 4 and 5 show the number of gambling
raids and the per cent of stolen property that was recovered in each
year.
The implications of Figures 1 through 5 may be stated briefly. So
far as concerns narcotics and weapons offenses in Cincinnati, the
Mapp decision does not seem to have had any effect whatever on the
number of arrests or upon the number or per cent of convictions. Some
changes are evident over the 12-year period covered by the figures, but
they bear no apparent relationship to the Mapp decision.
The number of gambling arrests and convictions- is down sharply
fIg,.
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Source: Same as Figure 1.

from 1960, the year before Mapp, to 1961 and subsequent years. Thus,
the average number of gambling convictions in the five years before
Mapp was 771, compared with 308, or less than half, in the six years
after Mapp. That difference undoubtedly reflects significant changes
in police behavior, which may have included closer adherence to
constitutional standards of search and seizure. But Figure 4 suggests
that the major factor was a consistent annual reduction in the number
of "raids" that resulted in gambling arrests. Thus, there was an
average of 242 raids per year in the five years before Mapp, and only
73 in the six years after. That difference might itself indicate an
important conformity induced by the Mapp decision, but Figure 4
shows that the decreasing number of raids began in 1959, two years
before the Mapp decision, and decreased consistently from year to year
through 1962, with no apparent relationship to the 1961 Mapp
decision.
fig...
4

GAMBLING RAIDS BY VICE CONTROL BUREAU
OF CINCINNATI POLICE, 1956 TO 1967
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Consists of total raids on handbooks, policy, and lottery places, and dice and card
games. Counts only raids where one or more arrests was made.
Source: Cincinnati Police, Annual Report of the Division of Police, 1956 through 1967,
Table 180.
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FIot. 5

PERCENT OF STOLEN PROPERTY RECOVERED
IN CINCINNATI ANJD TORONTO, 1956 TO 1967

Excludes motor vehicles.
Source: Cincinnati Police, Annual Report of the Division of Police, 1956 through 1967,
Table 96; Metropolitan Toronto Police Department Statistical Report, 1958 through 1967
(comparable figures unavailable for 1956-57), furnished by Inspector Aubrey V. Potter,
Letter of May 20, 1970.

Figure 5, which shows the per cent of stolen property recovered, is
included because police officers in various areas have advised the
author that they frequently find it necessary to violate search and
seizure rules in order to fulfill their paramount responsibility of
recovering stolen property. If this is true, and if the exclusionary rule
induces greater conformity to those rules, then adoption of the exclusionary rule should result in a decrease in the per cent of stolen
property that is recovered. Figure 5 shows that no such decrease
Figa.
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Source: Property Book, Cincinnati Police Department. Data compiled by University
of Cincinnati Law School students Paul Nemann and Charles Johnson, whose assistance
is gratefully acknowledged.
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occurred, at least not immediately. The fluctuations in recovery of
stolen property by the Cincinnati police seem unrelated to the adoption of the exclusionary rule.8 ' For comparative purposes the figure
also shows the per cent of recovery by the police in Toronto, Canada,
where there is no exclusionary rule. During the six years 1962 through
1967, when Cincinnati had an exclusionary rule and Toronto did not,
the percentages of stolen property recovered were approximately the
same, with Toronto being higher in three years and Cincinnati being
higher in three years. It may be significant that the Cincinnati percentage shows a consistent gradual decrease each year from 1963
through 1967, at the same time that Toronto's percentage consistently
increased. This may reflect a long range effect of the Mapp decision,
with decreased recoveries of stolen property as police officers begin to
accept and conform to the search and seizure requirements. This
evidence by itself is inconclusive, but it does provide some offset
against Figures 1 through 3, which tend to indicate that the exclusionary rule had no effect on the number of arrests and convictions for
weapons and narcotics offenses, and that important changes in
gambling statistics were probably attributable to something other
than the adoption of the exclusionary rule.
D. Seizures of Property
A more promising indirect measure of the extent of police conformity to search and seizure law is the amount of contraband or illegally
possessed property seized by the police. If law enforcement officials
conform more closely to the rules of search and seizure, then this may
change the amount of property seized. Police departments generally
keep records of such property. The property book kept by the Cincinnati police lists all property that has been seized and, fortunately
for this study, even classifies it in two categories, property seized for
use as evidence, and property confiscated without any intention to use
it as evidence.8 2- Figures 6 through 11 summarize the amount of various
types of property seized as evidence and confiscated by the Cincinnati
police during each of the three six-month periods just before and just
after the Mapp decision.
81 For example, the high per cent in 1958 was apparently attributable to the theft and
recovery of an extraordinarily large quantity of currency. The currency figures for 1958

were $1,008,000 stolen and $872,000 recovered, compared with an average of $141,000 and
$18,000 for the other four years in the period 1956-60.
82 Police offidals advise that the property seized for use as evidence may be returned

by permission of the officer or by order of the court. Property that is confiscated can be
returned only by order of the Chief of Police. The custodian of the property had never
heard of a civil action for return of confiscated property.
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The before-after comparisons of property seized by Cincinnati
police shown in Figures 6 through 11 yield the following inferences
concerning the effect of the exclusionary rule. The seizures of weapons
(rifles and shotguns, handguns, and knives) either for evidence in court
or by way of outright confiscation were essentially unchanged during
the period from 1960 through 1962. The same was true of narcotics
seized for use as evidence. There was no apparent change in enforcement results in either area following the Mapp decision.
Figures 10 and 11 show that there were marked decreases in the
quantity of gambling apparatus seized after the Mapp decision. Thus,
the average number of seizures of policy and bookmaking articles
dropped from 43 to 25 in the three six-month periods before and after
Mapp, a reduction of 42 per cent. Similarly, the average number of
seizures of cards and dice for use as evidence was down from 81 to 48,
FIl
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SEIZURES OF RIFLES AND SHOTGUNS
BY CINCINNATI POLICE, 1960 TO 1962
(IN SIX-MONTHPERIODS)

3960

Source: Same as Figure 6.

3962

1970]

Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure

695

FIi.te 9

SEIZURES OF NARCOTICS
BY CINCINNATI POLICE, 1960 TO 1962
(IN
70

70

SIX-MONTHPERIODS)

Mapp v.Ohto

Go
so
30
40
20

3

10

0

S

2 ST
1960

2D
IST
1962

29

(For£vId.ac. ani,

1961

Confilti., On neglgibIe}

Source: Same as Figure 6.

a reduction of 41 per cent. The average number of confiscations of
cards and dice was down from 127 to 23, a reduction of 82 per cent,
but in this instance the reduction seems to follow a trend that commenced before the Mapp decision.
The sharp reductions in gambling seizures must be considered in
light of the figures on gambling raids, set out in Figure 4. The number
of raids showed consistent decreases in this period, with 1961 down
25 per cent from 1960, and 1962 down an additional 31 per cent from
1961. If the 1961 raids are divided equally between 1960 and 1962
to obtain an eighteen-month figure for comparative purposes, then the
average number of raids in the three six-month periods after Mapp
was just 36 per cent lower than the average for the similar periods
before. This reduction is comparable to and is a probable explanation
of the 41 and 42 per cent reduction in the quantity of gambling
articles seized for use as evidence. If the number of raids does explain
the decrease in seizures, then the change probably is not attributable
FIttI.
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Figure£1

.SEIZURES OF CARDS AND DICE
BY CINCINNATI POLICE, 1960 TO 1$62
(IN SIX-MONTH PERIODS)
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to the adoption of the exclusionary rule, since Figure 4 shows that
the annual decreases in raids began well before the Mapp decision.
The 36 per cent decrease in the number of raids in this period may
not account for the 82 per cent reduction in the quantity of cards
and dice confiscated. Another cause must be sought, and the adoption
of the exclusionary rule is a distinct possibility. Decreased confiscations is one of the first effects to be expected if law enforcement
officials conform more closely to the rules of search and seizure in the
gambling area. The difficulty with this explanation is the fact, apparent from an examination of Figure 11, that the decreased number
of confiscations is largely, if not exclusively, expressive of a trend that
began before the Mapp decision. Firm conclusions on this point must
await comparison of the number of seizures over a longer period of
time.
E. Police Reports on the Reasons for Arrests
The most significant empirical study of the effects of the exclusionary
rule published after the Mapp case was the work of law students. It
also used a before-after comparison. To determine the effect of Mapp
on police practices in New York City, Columbia Law School students
analyzed the evidentiary grounds for arrest and subsequent disposition
of misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York City before and after
the Mapp decision. The evidentiary grounds were determined from
the facts of arrest reported by the arresting officer and recorded on
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documents in the case files in the criminal courts. The students
obtained this information for all misdemeanor narcotics cases reported
in six months from September through March, 1960-61 (just before
Mapp) and the same six-month period 1961-62 (just after Mapp).
Because they concluded that the type of police assignment might influence the response to Mapp, they classified the arrest data separately
for Narcotics Bureau, Uniform Division, and Plainclothes Detail. The
number of arrests by each group is shown in Table 8.83
TABLE 8
MISDEMEANOR

NARCOTICS ARRESTS BY

NEW YORK CITY POLICE, 1960-62

Six-month period
Job Assignment

Before Mapp

After Mapp

Difference

Narcotics Bureau
Uniform Division
Plainclothes Detail

1468
316
507

726
330
625

-51%
+ 4%
+23%

Total

2291

1681

-27%

The student authors felt that the sharp reduction in the number of
Narcotics Bureau arrests after the Mapp case supported the proposition
"that more than 50 per cent of the Bureau's pre-Mapp arrests were the
result of searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment,
and that its post-Mapp arrests were legal."8 4 As to pre-Mapp arrests,
these figures give some evidence of illegality, but the evidence is inconclusive. As to the legality of post-Mapp arrests, the figures give no
support whatever to the conclusion.
Of greater interest are the summaries in Table 9 of the officers'
accounts of how the evidence for the arrest was discovered.8 5
The student authors suggest that the 32 percentage point decrease
in Narcotics Bureau "hidden on person" allegations after Mapp shows
that the pre-Mapp figure contained a large proportion of unconstitutional searches and seizures. This conclusion is said to be supported
by the similar decreases in the proportion of hidden on person allegations by uniform and plainclothes officers (22 and 20 percentage
points). The corresponding increase in allegations by uniform and
83 Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROB. 87, 92 (1968). The trends in the table were
confirmed by samples of 100 cases in February, 1964 and February, 1966.
84 Id. The authors suggested that the Bureau's arrest rate declined sharply (while the
uniform and plainclothes rates remained relatively constant) because the Bureau is a

small, close-knit organization subject to rapid re-education and command influence.
85 Id. at 94.
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TABLE 9
NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICERS' ALLEGATIONS
REGARDING DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE IN
MISDEMEANOR NARCOTICS OFFENSES, 1960-62

Per Cent of Arrests
Six-month period
How Evidence Found:
Narcotics Bureau:
Hidden on Person
Dropped or Thrown to
Ground
(c) Visible in Hand or Arm
(d) Hidden on Premises
(e) Exposed on Premises
(f) Otherb
I.
(a)
(b)

Total
II. Uniform:
(a) Hidden on Person
(b) Dropped or Thrown to
Ground
(c) Visible in Hand or Arm
(d) Hidden on Premises
(e) Exposed on Premises
(f) Otherb
Total
III. Plainclothes:
(a) Hidden on Person
(b) Dropped or Thrown to
Ground
(c) Visible in Hand or Arm
()
Hidden on Premises
(d) Exposed on Premises
(e) Otherb
Total

Before
Mapp

After
Mapp

Difference

35

3

-32

17
22
10
3a
13

43
17
3
sa
31

+26
- 5
- 7
+18

100

100

31

9

-22

14
14
6
3a
32

21
19
5
sa
43

+ 7
+ 5
- 1
+11

100

100

24

4

-20

11
9
16

17
10
9

+ 6
+ 1
- 7

sa

sa

87

57

100

100

+20

a This is approximate. The table shows "less than 5%."
b The article gives no explanation of what allegations (if any) account for this "other"
category. The amount shown is approximate, within two percentage points.

plainclothes officers that defendant dropped the contraband to the
ground (so-called "dropsie" testimony) or had it "visible in hand" is
notable for the fact that this kind of testimony fits the probable cause\
requirements of Mapp.86 As to uniformed officers, the comment urges
86 The increase from 17% to 43% in the proportion of "dropsie" arrests by Narcotics
Bureau officers was not thought significant, because the number of dropsie arrests by
Bureau officers remained essentially constant before and after Mapp. The per cent of
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that the sharp increases in the number and per cent of "dropped or
thrown" and "in hand" arrests (the total of these two categories was
28% before Mapp and 40% just after) "render the veracity of complaining uniform officers subject to question."' sr The student authors
conclude:
Table [9] supports the conclusion that uniform police have
been fabricating grounds of arrest in narcotics cases in order
to circumvent the requirements of Mapp. Without knowledge of the results of this study, the two Criminal Court
judges and the two Assistant District Attorneys interviewed
doubted that a substantial reform of police practices in narcotics had occurred since Mapp. Rather, they believe that
s8
police officers are fabricating evidence to avoid Mapp.
Viewing the same phenomenon of the sharp increase after Mapp in the
proportion of New York City police officers testifying that they had
seen the defendant throw narcotics to the ground as the officer approached, both Richard Kuh and Irving Younger reached the same
conclusion, that after the Mapp case there was an increase in police
perjury designed to legalize an arrest and thus avoid the effect of the
exclusionary rule.8 9 But some police and prosecutors have given the
author an alternative and legal explanation for the observed increase
in the "dropped or thrown" and "in hand" grounds for arrest.90
dropsie arrests increased because the total number of Narcotics Bureau arrests was cut
in half in this period. Id. at 95. (See Table 8.)
87 Id.

88 Id. at 95-96. This Columbia study is a resourceful and imaginative attempt to
obtain an indirect measure of the effect of adoption of the exclusionary rule. The principal methodological difficulty is that most police departments apparently do not require
such reasons to be recorded, and even where this is done the records may not be
available this long after the Mapp decision. The author approached several metropolitan
police departments to try to obtain data to replicate the Columbia study, and was not
able to find any department where the data was available. A further difficulty of
interpreting such data-common to data obtained in other indirect tests-is discussed
in text accompanying note 136 infra.
89 Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of its Impact in New York,
148 N.Y.L.J. 4 n.2 (1962); Younger, ConstitutionalProtection on Search and Seizure Dead,
3 TRIAL 41 (Aug.-Sept. 1967), both quoted in F. RIEMINaToN, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL,
M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CIuMINAL JUsTIcE ADMINISTRATION 261-2, 272-3 (1969).

90 A person in possession of narcotics who sees a policeman approaching has a dilemma
that grows out of the exclusionary rule. If the officer has a warrant for his arrest, the
narcotics will be discovered and usable as evidence unless he can discard them. If the
officer has no warrant, then the person should retain the narcotics since any search necessary to discover them will probably be illegal and the exclusionary rule will prevent

their use in evidence. Knowing the difficulty that an uncertain possessor will have in
resolving this dilemma, a police officer without a warrant may rush a suspect, hoping to
produce a panic in which the person will visibly discard the narcotics and give the
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F. Observations of Police Behavior
Detailed observation of police behavior has also yielded valuable
insights into the effect of the exclusionary rule. Jerome H. Skolnick's
notable book, Justice Without Trial,91 is the most fruitful source of
information obtained by this technique. Over a period of fifteen
months in 1962 and 1963, Skolnick carried out many weeks of intensive "participant observation" of the operations of the police of an
unidentified city of 400,000. This included two weeks with police of
the patrol division, six weeks direct observation of the vice control
squad, four weeks with the burglary squad, and two weeks with the
robbery and homicide detail. Skolnick's observations of the effect of
the exclusionary rule on the police of this city may be summarized as
follows:
(1) The exclusionary rule was "neutralized" in practice.
(2) The police viewed the rule not as guaranteeing greater
protection of the freedom of decent citizens, but as unnecessarily complicating the task of detecting and apprehending
criminals.
(3) Because the policeman's allegiance was to the police
organization and to its network of professional responsibilities
and evaluative standards, he did not respond to judicial interpretations of legality.
(4) The police organization interpreted its fundamental
duty as the discovery of criminal activity. Remaining within
the boundaries of the law was secondary. Consequently, when
the police felt that the arrest and search and seizure rules
constituted too great a hindrance to the apprehension and
conviction of criminals, they would "reconstruct a set of
complex happenings in such a way that, subsequent to the
arrest, probable cause can be found according to appellate
court standards." In this way, "the policeman fabricates probable cause." 92
(5) "The policeman, as a tactical matter, recognizes an obligation to appear to be obeying the letter of procedural law,
while often disregarding its spirit. Thus, the working philosophy of the police has the end justifying the means; according to this philosophy, the 'demands of apprehension
require violation of procedural rules in the name of the
higher justification of reducing criminality." 93
officer cause to arrest him and a legitimate ground to use the evidence. It is said that an
increased use of this police tactic could explain the changes shown in Table 9.
91 J. SKOLNICK, JusmI E WrrmouT TRIAL (1967).
92 Id. at 215.
98 Id. at 228.
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(6) "Since in the policeman's hierarchy of values, arrest
and subsequent conviction are more important the 'bigger'
the 'pinch,' compliance with the exclusionary rule seems con94
tingent upon this factor."
Although it too lacks quantitative data, Wayne LaFave's 1956-57

American Bar Foundation field study of arrest practices in Kansas,
Michigan and Wisconsin also contains relevant impressions on the
exclusionary rule.9 5 Like Skolnick, he observed the police tendency
to rely on departmental rather than legal norms of behavior:
Even when the law is explicit, the legal norms governing
police behavior are seldom communicated to the officer on
the beat ....

Consequently, the average police officer is less

influenced by his knowledge of the legal standards than by
his observations of how more experienced officers react in
such situations.9 6
LaFave observes that "[i]t is apparent that the exclusionary rule is
not a deterrent to improper police practices in situations where the
police have no desire to prosecute and convict the person who is
arrested."9 7 He also states that there were some communities where
the police could hardly have been affected by court decisions on the
proper procedures for arrest and search because they were totally
unaware of them.98 But LaFave concludes that "[t]he exclusionary rule
has contributed to an increased awareness by police of constitutional
requirements," in part by giving courts and legislatures the occasion
and incentive to articulate them. °9
G. Canadian Comparison
The final source of empirical information about the effect of the
exclusionary rule is principally a suggestion for research rather than
a collection of available data. It would be instructive to compare the
degree of police adherence to search and seizure rules in comparable
jurisdictions with and without the exclusionary rule. Now that the
Mapp case requires all states to apply the exclusionary rule, it is necessary to go outside this country for current comparisons. An obvious
choice is Canada, which has no rule excluding illegally obtained evi94 Id.
95 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34.
96 Id. at 210-1. This passage appears in the context of a discussion about the degree
of force to use in-making an arrest.
97 Id. at 488.
98 Id. at 505.
99 Id. at 504-5.
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dence. 0 0° Toronto would be a suitable city for comparison.' 01 A study
could attempt to determine whether Toronto police adhere to their
local search and seizure rules as completely as police officers in a comparable United States city, and, if so, what factors are responsible for
that adherence,
Even without conducting such an empirical study, it is instructive
to ask how the Canadians manage to discourage illegal behavior by
law enforcement officials without resort to the exclusionary rule that
is apparently considered so essential on this side of the border. A superficial comparison suggests several factors of potential importance. 02
A brief description of course risks oversimplifying a complicated comparison. Being in large part matters of fact, the suggested factors should
themselves be the subject of factual inquiry. They are set out here
as an invitation to that inquiry.
To begin with, police discipline is relatively common and is said
to be seriously pursued in Canada, at least in Toronto. 03 Second,
100 The Canadian search and seizure law is discussed in Parker, The Extraordinary
Power to Search and Seize and the Writ of Assistance, 1 U.B.C.L. REv. 688 (1963); Weiler,
The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer, STUDIES IN CANADIAN
TORT LAiw 416-69 (Linden ed. 1968). Briefer treatments appear in Groom, The Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 13 CssrY's L.J. 54 (1964); Clendenning, Police
Power and Civil Liberties, 4 OsGooDn HALL L.J. 174 (1966); Martin, supra note 15.
The leading English case is Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197, 204, which gives
a judge "discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate
unfairly against an accused." The Ontario Court of Appeal recently carried that precedent as far as it had been carried in Canada in sustaining a trial judge who had exercised
his discretion to exclude part of a confession from evidence upon being shown that it had
been procured by trickery, duress and improper inducements. The opinion reasoned that
"a trial Judge has a discretion to reject evidence, even of substantial weight, if he considers that its admission would be unjust or unfair to the accused or calculated to bring
the administration of justice into disrepute . . . ." Regina v. Wray, [1970] 2 Ont. 3, 4.
That reasoning was rejected and the judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Canada. The Queen v. Wray, June 26, 1970 (not yet reported). The opinions give very
narrow scope to the judge's right to reject evidence that would "operate unfairly against
the accused," and clearly exclude considerations such as the manner in which the evidence
was obtained.
101 With a city population of about 700,000 in a metropolitan area of about 2 million,
Toronto's size characteristics are comparable to Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Washington, D.C.,
and Cleveland. And in comparison with other sizable Canadian cities, Toronto is probably
most like a United States city in the racial and ethnic diversity of its population.
102 In addition to cited authorities, observations about Toronto and Canadian law are
based upon information obtained during the author's brief conferences with police officials, prosecutors and a judge in Toronto. The author is specially indebted to Ian Cartwright, Crown Counsel in Toronto, for helpful suggestions on this section.
103 A comparison of disciplinary actions against Toronto and Chicago police is equivocal on whether Toronto is extraordinarily diligent.
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police officers are occasionally prosecuted for criminal misconduct
occurring in the course of their official duties.
Of paramount importance in the control of law enforcement behavior in Canada is the fact that an aggrieved person's tort cause of
action against an offending police officer is a real rather than just a
theoretical remedy. A Toronto lawyer has observed that
the remedy in tort has proved reasonably effective; Canadian
juries are quick to resent illegal activity on the part of the
police and to express that resentment by a proportionate
judgment for damages. 0 4
The prospect of tort liability is sufficiently real that some provincial
statutes give judges authority to grant law enforcement officials immunity against civil proceedings in individual cases, but this authority
is not routinely exercised. 10 5 An Ontario statute makes the chief constable of a municipal police force and the commissioner of the provincial police personally liable for the torts committed by members
Disposition of Complaints Against Police Officers

Total sworn personnel (excludes civilians such
as crossing guards)
Complaints handled
Complaints found valid
Disposition of offending officer:
Resigned
Dismissed
Reduced in rank
Suspended for period or lost days off
Reprimanded
Admonished and counselled

Chicago (1968)

Toronto (1969)

11,928
5,323
1,128

3,347
347
105

98
27
0
887
115
79

5
0
1
3
16
80

Total
1,206
105
Source: Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Toronto Police
Department, 1969, Schedule C. The Chicago Police Department does not release statistical
information on the disposition of complaints. The Chicago figures are those compiled
and published by The Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7, 1969, at 2.
104 Martin, supra note 15, at 272. Illustrative cases are Lamb v. Benoit, 17 D.L.R.2d 369
(Can. Sup. Ct. 1959) ($2,500 false arrest damages for two days confinement without cause);
Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton, 11 D.L.R.2d 447 (Ont. Ct. App. 1957).
A former Canadian police officer has written the following about arrest practices:
"Based on my experience, and also conversations with police officers, most officers stay
within the powers given to them. Only in rare circumstances will this power be exceeded,
primarily because excesses are very easily proven, thus leaving the officer open to attack."
Clendenning, supra note 100, at 185. This author identifies the most frequent abuse as
the search of a vehicle believed to contain stolen goods.
105 Re Yoner, 7 D.L.R.3d 185 (Sup. Ct. Brit. Col. 1969).
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of their force in the performance or purported performance of their
duties.10 6 The prominence of the tort remedy is such that one Canadian
scholar has observed that "the task of controlling police practices,
especially in the making of an arrest, historically has been performed
by the institution of tort law, with relatively little help from the rest
107
of the legal system."'
The standard for police behavior and the manner in which this
issue is brought before Canadian courts in tort and other proceedings
is of interest. Canada has no written law comparable to the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Canadian Parliament enacted a bill of rights in 1960,108 but it
contains no provision on this subject. The law protecting a Canadian
citizen against police misconduct is the common law, which provides
remedies for invasions of personal and property rights unless the offender is able to furnish some justification for his action. A person
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure that located incriminating
evidence cannot have the evidence excluded or obtain other relief in
the criminal prosecution, so he has the burden of going forward to
seek relief in another proceeding.
Two types of proceedings, both initiated by the aggrieved party,
provide the principal occasions for Canadian courts to issue rulings
on the propriety of police behavior. The first is a motion for an order
in lieu of a writ of certiorari to quash a search warrant. This remedy
challenges the sufficiency of a warrant or of the "information" on which
the warrant was issued. If the motion is granted the judge will, inter
alia, order the return of the articles seized under the warrant, thus
preventing their use as evidence. 10 9 However, if he still needs them
as evidence the peace officer can immediately repeat the procedure,
correctly, and seize the articles a second time. The scope of the motion
to quash is further limited by the fact that it is only available to chal106 ONT. REV. STAT. c. 99, § 23; c. 118, § 43a (1960).
107 Weiler, supra note 100, at 419. Weiler criticizes the tort remedy and advocates
strengthening internal police discipline.
108 CAN. STAT. c. 44 (1960).

109 Certiorari was the common law remedy to quash a search warrant. Rex v. Kehr,
11 Ont. 517 (1906); Re Yoner, 7 D.L.R.3d 185 (Sup. Ct. Brit. Col. 1969). In Ontario that
remedy has been replaced by a statutory motion to quash. ONT. Ray. STAT. c. 197, § 66
(1960); Worrall v. Swan and Sawatzky, [1965] 1 Ont. 527. The Worrall case might even
be read to suggest that under this statute the judge could quash a conviction obtained
by the improperly obtained evidence.
For a discussion of legal standards for the sufficiency of a warrant or information, and
for numerous cases involving attempts to quash warrants, see Parker, supra note 100, at
696-702; CRANSHAw's CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA §§ 429-48, at 589-613 (7th ed. Popple
1959).
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lenge official action under a warrant, whereas a great majority of police
arrests (and accompanying searches of the accused's person) are made
without a warrant. 110
The second and more comprehensive occasion for ruling on the
propriety of police behavior is in a tort action, such as trespass or
false imprisonment, in which the defendant officer attempts to justify
his conduct under some common law rule or some act of Parliament
or provincial legislation that protects him from civil liability. The
principal federal statute in this area is section 25 of the Canadian
Criminal Code, which provides that a person required or authorized
by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the
law "is, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, justified in
doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much
force as is necessary for that purpose.""' The word "justified" means
that the official has a defense against liability if he acts on "reasonable
and probable grounds." The defense is clear as to criminal liability,
and some authorities have even applied the Code to absolve defendants
from civil liability, although there are substantial doubts about its
validity in this application. 1 2 In any case, an officer who has acted
reasonably can count on a common law defense against liability for
damages. In order to resolve the applicability of the defense in the
damage action the court must consider and rule upon the meaning
of the statutes and common laws relating to arrests and search and
seizure.

1 13

Another possible factor in the control of Canadian police, difficult
110 It is said that more than 90% of the arrests in Metro Toronto are made without
a warrant. Weiler, supra note 100, at 480 n.28.
111 CAN. STAT. C. 51, § 25 (1953-54).
112 CRANKSHAW'S CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA §§ 434-5, at 598 (7th ed. Popple 1959). For
cases in which an action against a police officer for assault or false imprisonment was dismissed on the ground that the officer had acted "on reasonable and probable grounds" and
thus was free from civil liability, see Reid v. DeGroot and Brown, 42 Can. Crim. 252 (Sup.
Ct. Nova Scotia en banc 1964); Pedersen v. Hansen and Reid, 2 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 348
(Sup. Ct. Brit. Col. 1963); Kennedy v. Tomlinson, 126 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 175 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1959).
There is a problem of federalism in this use of the Criminal Code to provide a defense
in an action of tort. The British North America Act of 1867, 80 Vict., c. 3, §§ 91-92,
6 CAN. REv. STAT. (1952), gives the federal (Dominion) Parliament exclusive authority
in criminal law and procedure, but gives the provincial legislatures exclusive authority
over property and civil rights and all matters of a merely local or private nature. See
generally Leigh, The Supreme Court and the Canadian Constitution, 2 Orr. L. Rav. 320,
329-36 (1968). Some Canadian lawyers have suggested that this division of power makes
§ 25 of the Criminal Code ultra vires because the Dominion has no right to absolve a
peace officer from a civil wrong.
113 CAN. REv. STAT. c. 51, §§ 96, 425-48 (1952); cases cited and discussed in CRANKsUAW'S CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA §§ 425-48, at 588-613.
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to isolate but of great potential importance, is their tendency to obey
the rules, irrespective of sanctions. Toronto police officials, prosecutors
and a judge all insisted that their police are greatly concerned about
obeying the rules and very sensitive to and quick to be influenced by
judicial criticism of their conduct. It is doubtful that comparable
United States officials would similarly describe the attitudes of their
police.
As a final factor of control, the attitude and authority of Canadian
prosecutors may be different from those of their United States counterparts. Experienced Toronto prosecutors advised the author that a prosecutor will sometimes exercise what he considers to be his teaching
function with the police by refusing to introduce evidence that he considers to have been improperly obtained. Police officers are said to take
such refusals very seriously and to modify their conduct in response to
them. As a related and additional difference, Canadian prosecutors are
part of the Ministry of Justice, which has direct or indirect command
authority over most of the police organizations whose members engage in the conduct that prosecutors criticize. Consequently, if police
arrest or search and seizure practices are offensive to a prosecutor,
he has channels available to have them corrected. This is significantly
different from the independent character of most United States prosecutors and police organizations, neither of which is in a position to
bring any direct command influence on the other.
H. Summary of Findings
The empirical research previously published and the additional data
set out here may be summarized as follows:
(1) More than half of the motions to suppress in the District of Columbia and Chicago concerned narcotics and weapons offenses. Most of
the remaining motions were in one other crime category, gambling in
Chicago and offenses against property in the District. This is persuasive
evidence that the search and seizure practices that are supposed to be
affected by the exclusionary rule are concentrated in the enforcement
14
of these few crimes.1

(2) In 1969 about 45 per cent of all persons charged with gambling
offenses in Chicago were being dismissed after granting of a motion
to suppress evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The
comparable figure was 33 per cent for narcotics offenses and 24 per cent
for carrying a concealed weapon. These figures show that illegal
searches and seizures were commonplace in the enforcement of gambling, narcotics and weapons offenses by the Chicago police. They also
114 See text following note 68 supra.
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provide evidence that the exclusionary rule does not deter the Chicago
police from making illegal searches and seizures in a large proportion
of the cases that come to court in these crime areas. 115
(3) Comparisons of law enforcement statistics in various areas can
be misleading because of differences in the criminal justice systems
of cities and states. Thus, the extremely low proportion of District of
Columbia defendants who are dismissed after the granting of a motion to suppress is equivocal on the extent of illegal searches and
seizures in that area, since District prosecutors exercise a screening
function and withhold filing some cases where the evidence is likely
to be suppressed." 6
(4) An examination of twelve years' statistics on law enforcement
in Cincinnati shows:
(a) that the adoption of the exclusionary rule had no apparent
effect upon the number of arrests or convictions in narcotics,
weapons or gambling offenses; and
(b) that the adoption of the exclusionary rule had no immediate effect on the per cent of stolen property recovered, but
there was a gradual decrease commencing several years after
the Mapp decision.
These facts stand as some evidence that the adoption of the exclusionary rule did not work a significant change in Cincinnati search and
seizure practices in narcotics, weapons or gambling offenses, but it may
have had a slight long range effect of inducing greater conformity in
7
searches for stolen property."
(5) An examination of the quantity of property seized by the Cincinnati police during eighteen-month periods immediately before and
after the Mapp decision showed no change in the seizures of weapons
or narcotics, but sharp decreases in the seizures of gambling apparatus. Some or all of the decrease in gambling seizures could be
explained in terms of changes in law enforcement techniques that
began two years before the Mapp decision, but the adoption of the
exclusionary rule was also a possible cause. This data on property seizures furnishes further evidence that adoption of the exclusionary rule
made no significant change in Cincinnati search and seizure practices
in narcotics and weapons cases, but it suggests a possible effect in
gambling." 8
115 See text following note 71 supra.
116 See text following note 77 supra.
117

See text following note 80 supra.

118 See text following note 82 supra.
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(6) In Canada, improper police behavior is controlled by internal
police discipline, by command control that is partly responsive to the
prosecutor, *andby a relatively effective tort remedy.119
(7) Though clearly insufficient to justify a firm conclusion on the
matter, there is some evidence that:
(a) Police training in search and seizure rules is more extensive
where there is an exclusionary rule; 120
(b) Police adherence to legality in searches was thought to have
increased generally after the Mapp decision, with the proportion
of perceived increase in states that Mapp had forced to adopt
the exclusionary rule being larger than the increase in states
that had the rule all along;
(c) Police effectiveness in searches was perceived to have decreased more in states that had just adopted the exclusionary
11
rule than in states that had the rule before Mapp. 2
(8) Shortly after the Mapp decision, the proportion of uniformed
New York City police officers who reported "narcotics in plain view"
as the evidentiary ground for arrest in misdemeanor narcotics offenses
more than doubled. This furnishes some evidence that the police were
fabricating testimony in order to comply with arrest formalities and
1 22
circumvent the exclusionary rule.

(9) Scholars who have made sustained observations of police operations have reached the following conclusions:
(a) The exclusionary rule has contributed to an increased
awareness of constitutional requirements by the police.
(b) The exclusionary rule will not affect police practices where
the police have no desire to prosecute.
(c) The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a control upon
police behavior varies in direct proportion to the seriousness
of the crime.
(d) In general, and especially for less serious crimes, the most
important determinants of police behavior are the institutional
values of the police department, which set a higher value on the
prevention of crime and apprehension of the criminal than upon
adherence to legal "technicalities" concerning police behavior.
Consequently, the police will conform their testimony to the
119 See
120 See
121 See
122 See

text
text
text
text

following
following
following
following

note 102 supra.
notes 65 & 67 supra.
note 67 supra.
note 83 supra.
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content necessary to avoid these "procedural" barriers and to
123
assure accomplishment of their law enforcement objectives.
Writing just after the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, Francis A. Allen
declared that up to that time, "no effective quantitative measure of
the rule's deterrent efficacy has been devised or applied."'124 That conclusion is not yet outdated. The foregoing findings represent the
largest fund of information yet assembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule, but they obviously fall short of an empirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
They also fall short of demonstrating a research method by which that
important question could be determined. That is the subject of the
next section.

IV.

DESIGNING

AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DETERRENT

EFFECT

OF THE

ExcLusIONARY

RULE

As used here, the concept of deterrence embodies all of the forces
that unite to discourage a person from violating a rule. This section
reviews various aspects of deterrence suggested in the literature on
the deterrent effect of punishments, applies them to the exclusionary
rule, and discusses possible techniques and areas for further research.
A. Aspects of Deterrence
Although the subject has only recently caught the interest of a substantial number of scholars, a useful body of writing on the deterrent
effect of punishments is already beginning to emerge. 1 25 The literature

identifies two different types of deterrence.
Special deterrence (or "special prevention") is the effect of a sanction on an individual who has already experienced it. It measures
the likelihood of his repeating particular behavior once he has been
singled out to taste its consequences. The exclusionary rule is not
aimed at special deterrence since it does not impose any direct punish123 See text following notes 91 & 95 supra.
124 Allen, supra note 3, at 34.
125 Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 176
(1952); Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949
(1966); Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76 (1968); Crampton,
Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REv. 421
(1969); Morris & Zimring, Deterrence and Corrections, 381 ANNALs 137 (1969); H. PACKER,
THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrIoN 39-45 (1968); Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 274 (1967); Zimring & Hawkins, Deterrence and Marginal Groups,
5 J. Ras. CRIME & DELINQ. 100 (1968); Zimring, Perspectives on Deterrence (Center for
Studies of Crime and Delinquency, National Institute of Mental Health, Monograph
Series, 1970).
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ment on a law enforcement official who has broken the rule. An officer
may of course experience disappointment at seeing evidence suppressed
and an offender go free, and that experience may affect his future
behavior. If the officer also had to suffer departmental discipline or
forfeit promotion, prestige, or other advantages because of the application of the exclusionary rule to his cases, then this could give the
exclusionary rule an important special deterrent effect. But diligent
inquiry has failed to reveal a single law enforcement agency where individual sanctions are tied to an application of the exclusionary rule.
The rule is apparently expected to achieve its purpose without them.
The exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all
law enforcement officials and society at large. It is meant to discourage
violations by individuals who have never experienced any sanction for
them. The exclusionary rule is therefore meant to achieve its purpose
through what is called general deterrence (or "general prevention").
General deterrence includes two kinds of effects, one immediate
and the other long range. The immediate effect is direct deterrence,
which is the compliance induced by the threat of the sanction. It is of
course dependent upon effectively communicating the rule and the
nature of the sanction to the individuals supposed to be affected by it.
If they do not "get the message" there will be no direct deterrence. In
the context of the exclusionary rule, direct deterrence is the extent
to which the law enforcement officer observes the search and seizure
rules because of his realization that the evidence will be inadmissible
in court if he does not. In addition to communication, direct deterrence is also dependent upon how gravely law enforcement officers
view the consequences of excluding evidence, and upon how they
compare those consequences with the competing alternatives. In other
words, the direct deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will depend
upon the individuals' perceptions of the relative costs of conformity or
nonconformity with the rule. 26 Those perceptions will of course vary
from person to person and from one group to another. There will also
be differences in the extent to which individuals actually make conscious or unconscious weighings of the consequences before acting. An
article of faith in respect to the deterrent effect of the criminal law is
its greater probable effect upon deliberate crimes like burglary or
embezzlement than upon impulsive crimes like assault. Because the
exclusionary rule operates upon conduct that is generally quite de126 This analysis is traceable to Jeremy Bentham. H. PACKER, supra note 125, at 40-41.
Some observers, persuaded that potential criminals do not weigh the pros and cons before
acting, have rejected the whole idea of direct deterrence in respect to the criminal law.
Others affirm the value of the analysis, but urge that it be applied selectively. Id. at 41;
Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. I. The succeeding text tries to do this.
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liberate and frequently even the result of formal or informal law
enforcement policies, it is likely to involve a calculation of alternatives
at some point. The extent of such weighing will of course vary from
group to group within the law enforcement community. For example,
it may be minimal in respect to patrolmen and considerable in respect
to detectives or other highly trained and disciplined groups.
In addition to direct deterrent effect, a sanction has a variety of
indirect and long range effects that operate to discourage violations of
the rule. The writings of Johannes Andenaes, Herbert Packer and
Franklin Zimring identify three indirect ways in which the threat of
punishment may play a role in deterring violations of the criminal
law.12 All have some relevance to the probable deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.
The first and probably most important is the "moral or educative
influence" of the law. What Packer calls the "heavy symbolic significance" of the criminal sanction is an important ingredient in teaching
what society accepts and what it will not accept as appropriate personal behavior. "The act is branded as reprehensible by authorized
organs of society," Andenaes states, "and this official branding of the
conduct may influence attitudes quite apart from the fear of sanctions.."128 The existence and imposition of a sanction reinforces the
rule and underlines the importance of observing it. The principle is
directly applicable to the exclusionary rule. The salient defect in the
rule of Wolf v. Colorado was the difficulty of persuading anyone that
the guarantees of the fourth amendment were seriously intended and
important when there was no sanction whatever for their violation.
As a visible expression of social disapproval for the violation of these
guarantees, the exclusionary rule makes the guarantees of the fourth
amendment credible. Its example teaches the importance attached to
129
observing them.
As a second indirect effect, a threat of punishment for violation of
the rules helps to develop patterns or habits of conforming behavior
that continue to influence an individual's conduct long after he has
ceased to weigh the pros and cons of observance. This is also a
127

Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CriM. L.Q. 76, 80-81 (1968); H.
supra note 125, at 42-45; Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. I.

PAcxER,

128 Andenaes, supra note 127, at 81.
This point combines two effects described by Zimring, the effect of the rule in
teaching what society views as right and wrong, and the effect of the threat or imposition
of punishment in convincing the doubtful that society means what it says. As to the
latter Zimring observes: "If the solemn commands of a legal system were not reinforced
with the threat of punishment, many individuals would see no basis for concluding that
the legal system really meant what it said." Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. I, § 3.
120
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potential result of the exclusionary rule, at least as to those aspects
of law enforcement conduct that become highly routine.
A third indirect effect of a sanction is that it assists a potential
offender by giving him an additional reason to resist temptation and
avoid the proscribed conduct. 1 0 In the immediate context, this reason
suggests that the exclusionary rule may be valuable in reinforcing the
position of law enforcement officials who are disposed to observe the
search and seizure rules but need something tangible to give fellow
officers as their reason for doing so.
B. Designing an Empirical Test
It is no easy task to design an empirical test of the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule. The measurement of direct deterrent effect
is difficult enough, without having the problem further complicated
by the probability of important indirect effects.
1. Research Methods. Most of the possible research techniques
were illustrated in the preceding section-the before-after comparison,
the multiple-area comparison, and the field observation.' 31 One addition
is the field experiment, which tests the effect of a rule in a single area
during a single period of time by making the presence or absence of
the rule the only variable between two otherwise similar experimental
groups or situations.132 As applied to the exclusionary rule, serious
constitutional and practical difficulties prohibit the field experiment
and the multiple-area comparison, since the Mapp decision eliminates
the basis for comparison by requiring the exclusionary rule to be used
in every jurisdiction and group of cases in this country. 133
The most promising method for an overall test of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule is the before-after test. About 24 states
were abruptly compelled to adopt the exclusionary rule in 1961 when
Mapp v. Ohio made it a constitutional requirement. 13 4 A before-after
130

Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. I,

§

4.

131 See text preceding note 65 supra. The various methods are discussed in Andenaes,

The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 973-8 (1966);
Crampton, supra note 125, at 449-52; Morris & Zimring, supra note 125, at 144-5. Another
method, basic research, attempts to contribute to the knowledge of deterrence by enlarging what is known about behavior in general or the ingredients or determinants of
behavior in the special context of deterrence. This paper has nothing to contribute in the
way of basic research, which is predominantly the domain of disciplines other than law.
132 See Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 125, at 284-6. For an excellent summary of "the
tools of causal analysis," see H. ZEISEL, SAY rr wrrs FIGUREs ch. 7 (5th ed. rev. 1968).
133 Apart from the Mapp ruling, any experimental situation that applied one legal
rule to one group of defendants and another rule to another group would raise serious
questions under the requirements of equal protection. Morris, Impediments to Penal
Reform, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 627, 645-55 (1966); Crampton, supra note 125, at 451-2.
134 The following states did not apply the exclusionary rule in June, 1960, one year
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test can focus on changes that occurred in any of these areas when
Mapp was adopted. At this point, almost ten years after Mapp, there
are obvious difficulties. Methods dependent upon subjective evidence,
such as questionnaire or interview explanations or opinions of law
enforcement personnel, probably will not yield conclusions of acceptable certainty. The passage of time gives added force to the usual
objections that such subjective responses are apt to be clouded in
ambiguity or distorted by faulty recollection or bias. As for objective
data, much of this will have been destroyed since 1961. But some
will remain.
The major difficulty with a before-after test is in locating some
objective manifestation of behavior or change in behavior of law
enforcement personnel that can be said to be primarily attributable to
the exclusionary rule. The ideal criterion would be the number or rate
of illegal searches; that is, searches not authorized by a valid search
or arrest warrant or incident to an arrest based on probable cause.
But how does one ascertain which searches were legal and which were
illegal, especially when the events took place seven to nine years ago?
Even if there were a written record of the search-which is unlikelythe record would rarely show whether the arrest was in conformity
with all the rules. And it is in the nature of things that there will be
no written record of many illegal arrests and searches. The only available information about these events will be the subjective recollection
of participants, which is not a reliable source for the reasons suggested
earlier.
It is therefore necessary to seek objective criteria that are, at best,
indirect evidence on the question. A comparison of the number of
motions to suppress before and after the adoption of the exclusionary
rule would provide no illumination. The number of motions would
be negligible before and relatively numerous after. That difference
would merely attest to the obvious fact that lawyers will not make a
motion to suppress when the evidence cannot be excluded and will
when it can. 135 Changes in the number or proportion of arrests with
before Mapp: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont
and Virginia. In addition, four other states had only a partial exclusionary rule: Alabama,
Maryland, Michigan and South Dakota. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32
(1960) (appendix). Other states with relatively recent changes are Delaware, which
adopted the exclusionary rule in 1950, North Carolina in 1951, California in 1955, and
Rhode Island in 1956. Allen, supra note 3, at 27-28.
135 Significant trends in the proportion of motions to suppress that are granted over
a substantial period of years might be indicative of changes in police behavior. Thus, if
the rate of suppression declined, this might indicate that the amount of illegal police
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a warrant and without a warrant might provide a valuable contrast
before and after the exclusionary rule was adopted. However, this
information is not likely to be available. Police and court records are
not geared to answering questions about the manner of arrest or the
number of warrants issued in a particular period of time. Moreover,
the passage of time since Mapp v. Ohio often will have resulted in the
destruction of whatever records were kept. The author contacted
several large police departments and none could furnish this warrant
information.
In sum, it appears that so far as existing statistics are concerned,
there is no better indirect statistical measure of the effect of the exclusionary rule on conformity to search and seizure rules than arrest
and conviction rates in selected crimes and data on seizure of selected
types of property. Both of these were illustrated in the preceding
section.
There are many difficulties with such indirect tests of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. Two are apparent at the surface. The
first is that the exclusionary rule is only one of a variety of possible
causes for changes or lack of changes observed in the indicia being
used. The amount of seizures of property, for example, may be attributable to changes in enforcement efforts (such as the changing number
of gambling raids noted in Figure 4) that have no relationship to the
exclusionary rule. As a first step, the researcher must eliminate alternative causes and satisfy himself that the effect observed in the index
was actually caused by the exclusionary rule.
The second difficulty, which is inherent in the use of indirect
methods to test the deterrent effect of the rule, is that the exclusionary
rule may affect the index without affecting the illegal behavior. Thus,
the Columbia University study measured changes in the reasons police
gave before and after the Mapp decision for making narcotics arrests.
Even after it is assumed that the Mapp case produced the changes,
there is still a question as to whether the change represents a change
in police conduct in arrests or merely a change in police reports about
arrests. 13 6 Similarly, adoption of the exclusionary rule may make no
behavior was declining. But the evidence is ambiguous. A decline might also result from
increases in the number of frivolous motions, changes in the substantive law of search and
seizure, or changes in patterns of police testimony. On the latter, see text following note
85 supra.
136 Relying on their assumption that the police were unlikely to have changed their
behavior in the way indicated in their reports, the Columbia students concluded that
after the Mapp case some police were giving false reports of the reasons for their arrests.
Text at note 88 supra. That conclusion cannot be validated until the underlying assumption is proven. If the conclusion is correct, then the proven fact of police fabrication is
important in weighing the desirability of the exclusionary rule, as discussed more fully
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change whatever in the degree of official observance of search and
seizure rules, but may still cause police officers to change their method
of disposing of property that has been illegally seized (such as by
substituting private destruction or confiscation for official inventory
procedures). If so, then changes in the index of contraband seized
could give a false impression of changes in actual police adherence
to the rules.
2. The Complexity of the Question. There is a more pervasive
difficulty with all of the foregoing methods for measuring the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule; they all tend to oversimplify an enormously complex inquiry. All suggest a simple answer to a simple
question-whether or not the exclusionary rule deters police from
illegal behavior. But the subject is not as simple as determining
whether the suspect's fingerprint is on the gun, yes or no. Any
attempt to determine whether or the extent to which the exclusionary
rule affects the behavior of law enforcement personnel confronts an
exceedingly complicated inquiry into human motivation within a
complex social model, the criminal justice system.
The breadth and complexity of the motivation problem is implicit
in Packer's suggestion that an inquiry into the operation of general
deterrence in the criminal law should be broadened to include the
effect of punishment "on the totality of conscious and unconscious
motivations that govern the behavior of men in society."1 37 Andenaes
has suggested that any realistic discussion of general deterrence must
give individual consideration to each of the various reasons individuals
have for violating various types of rules. 138 Zimring discusses six
variables that account for great differences in the general deterrent
effects of a sanction: (1) differences among men, (2) varieties of threatened behavior, (3) differences in the-way the threat is communicated,
(4) individual perceptions of the applicability and credibility of the
threat, (5) variations in threatened consequences, and (6) the moral
quality of the threatened behavior. 13 9
We are just beginning to sense the complexities of the criminal
justice system and its enormous variations from city to city and state
to state. Variations in the organization and style of police departments,
such as those discussed in James Q. Wilson's Varieties of Police Behereafter. But the fact of fabrication is not direct evidence on the overall deterrent effect
or lack of deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. It is evidence on the issue of deterrence
only if one infers that the reports were falsified in order to avoid the effect of the exclusionary rule. For another possible explanation of the data see note 90 supra.
137 H. PACKER, supra note 125, at 42.
138 Andenaes, supra note 127, at 80.

139 Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. III, § 1. See also Zimring & Hawkins, supra note

125.
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havior,140 are bound to have an important effect on whether, when,
and how much a legal rule will affect police behavior. And it must be
remembered that "the police" is not a monolithic entity. There are
officers in positions of command, staff, special assignment (like narcotics detail) and patrol, to name only a few. A policeman's perceptions of the search and seizure rules and of the exclusionary rule as
an enforcement device are bound to be affected by his assignment and
by the way he interacts with other police and with personnel in other
parts of the criminal justice system. The role of the prosecutor is
subject to great variation, as pointed out in the contrast between
Chicago and the District of Columbia. And the manner in which
courts perform their function is another variable of immense diversity.
In this incredibly diverse milieu of different police departments and
criminal justice systems and different individual motivations and
sensitivity to sanctions, the researcher must consider not one but a
variety of possible effects, some long term and some short term, some
subtle and some obvious. In addition to the direct deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule, he must try to measure its indirect impact, such
as its moral or educative effect.
In view of the complexity of the inquiry, it presently appears to be
impossible to design any single test or group of tests that would give
a reliable measure of the overall dterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule on law enforcement behavior. But it is possible to nibble around
the edges of the problem by small inquiries that illuminate areas of
special importance. The most promising of these are the inquiries
discussed below.
3. Promising Areas for Research. There are four particularly
promising areas for study in this field, any one of which might yield
valuable information as to the efficacy of the exclusionary rule and as
to possible alternatives or supplements to the rule.
(a) Analyzing the violations. The single most important unanswered question concerning the effect of the exclusionary rule is why
police officers break the search and seizure rules. We know that there
is widespread illegal law enforcement behavior, and we know the
areas of law enforcement behavior in which it is concentrated. We
need to focus on these areas to determine what causes line officers
to observe the law of arrest and search and seizure in various situations, and what causes them to break it. This would require identifying the most common types of police violations of search and seizure
rules in the enforcement of various types of crime. It would require
determining what illegal searches and seizures were approved by law
140 J. WiLsoN, VA IETE

OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968).
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enforcement norms, and why they were approved. It would result in
an analysis of the relative costs of conformity and nonconformity with
the rules of search and seizure. (For example, why do officers arrest a
person or search an area without obtaining a warrant to do so?)141 This

inquiry could not be pursued by examining existing statistics. It
would require quantitative analysis of new information derived from
observation and conversation with officers and victims. It would follow
1 42
the technique of "reason analysis" described by Hans Zeisel.
(b) The Canadian experience. Another important and practical
area for research would be the operation of supplements or alternatives to the exclusionary rule. One promising approach would be a
study of how the Canadians manage to discourage illegal law enforcement behavior. The brief observations about Toronto in the preceding
43
section suggest a number of inquiries to pursue.1
(c) The tort remedy. As another possibility, scholars have frequently suggested a tort cause of action against the offending officer
or his employer as a supplement or alternative to the exclusionary
rule. 144 There is need for a study of the extent to which the tort
remedy is presently used for this purpose, and especially of the extent
to which employing agencies try to reduce illegal behavior when they
are subjected to damage liability for it. There is almost no published
factual information. 145 The study should also seek to determine what
141 Some police officers have complained to the author that the arrest and search and
seizure rules are so inhibiting that they cannot make a valid arrest or search and get a
conviction even where they know that a particular person possesses stolen goods and
where those goods are located. They claim that their reliable policeman's intuition cannot
be translated into the necessary probable cause for a warrant. Consequently, the choice
is often between an elaborate stakeout involving hundreds of hours of police time that
is badly needed elsewhere or a breaking of the rules that recovers the stolen property
but forgoes the conviction. In other instances police claim that the time and trouble
of obtaining a warrant is prohibitive in view of the practical exigencies of law enforcement. These and other asserted costs of conformity should be evaluated to determine
whether the true source of difficulty is the substantive rule or the way in which it is
administered by police or courts.
142 H. ZmsEL, supra note 132, at chs. 10-11.
143 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
144 Authorities cited notes 36 & 37 supra.
145 William M. Briggs, J.D. '69, then a University of Chicago Law School student,
examined the docket books of the federal district court in Chicago for the years 1960
to 1967 to obtain a sample of 35 civil rights damage actions against police officers in
which the City of Chicago or the police superintendent or department was originally
joined as a co-defendant. The actions arose out of circumstances in which most of the
plaintiffs had criminal charges placed against them. The plaintiffs prevailed in 18 of
these cases (3 by jury trial and 15 by settlement or bench trial), and obtained judgments

totalling $126,000. The City of Chicago paid the judgments under state law, note 37
supra, but not one of the 18 officers who had been found in the wrong was disciplined
by the Police Department, not even by reprimand. Briggs, 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983: An
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changes of substantive law or procedure would give the aggrieved
individual a practical damage remedy against the officer or his employer. It may be advisable to modify the terms of the tort cause of
action or the measure of damages or to make provision for counsel for
the plaintiff. The Constitution undoubtedly leaves Congress and the
state legislatures wide latitude in such matters. The present tort
remedy is ill suited for controlling the police since the measure of
damages is not related to the enormity of the wrong committed by the
defendant (police officer). Instead, the damages are determined by the
injury suffered by the plaintiff, and that injury often cannot be
measured in economic terms.146 This defect could of course be remedied by changes in the cause of action and the measure of damages. 147
It is also suggested that juries will not give adequate verdicts against
police officers, especially in favor of a plaintiff who was an accused or
convicted criminal. Then the law might be changed to abolish juries in
such cases. An individual police officer may have a constitutional right
to a jury trial, at least in a common law action for damages, but a
governmental body probably does not. Judges or administrative
bodies will probably be willing to award significant damages for
invasions of constitutional rights, even to those guilty of crimes. By
means of the exclusionary rule the state judiciary has grown accustomed to compensating a guilty person who was aggrieved by an
illegal search by awarding him his freedom. There is no reason to
suppose that they would be less willing to give money damages as a
form of compensation, especially when the remedy would extend to
all who were aggrieved, the innocent as well as the guilty. If the
Canadian research verifies that the Canadians have a practical tort
remedy against law enforcement officers, that study could also suggest
other changes for this country.
Recent cases in the federal courts may portend the development of
one or more effective federal damage remedies against illegal law
enforcement conduct. On the subject of damages, a Seventh Circuit
decision held that a plaintiff in a civil rights action could recover for
attorney's fees incurred and for confinement suffered as a result of
Effective Deterrent to Police Brutality? (unpublished research paper on file in University
of Chicago Law School Library).
146 Weiler, supra note 100, at 443-7; Foote, supra note 36, at 496-500. Foote contrasts
the action for trespass, which he calls "completely impotent," with the "steady trickle of
false imprisonment cases." The difference is in the higher damage ceiling for false imprisonment because "the jury is given wide scope in attaching a dollar value to immeasurables such as the sense of humiliation, distress, disgrace or outrage, or the usually
fictional damages to reputation." Foote, supra note 36, at 497-8.
147 For a list of suggested changes to make the tort action an effective remedy against
police misconduct, see Foote, supra note 86, at 504-16.
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invasion of his constitutional rights. 14 A Fourth Circuit case held that
a youth whom a police officer had shot in a reckless use of force during
an arrest attempt could recover damages under the Civil Rights Act,
and could also recover damages-including pain and suffering-for
assault and battery under a pendent claim based on state law. 149 As
for the cause of action, the Second Circuit has recently held in a case
of first impression that an unconstitutional search and seizure does
not, in the absence of legislation, give rise to a federal cause of action
for damages, but a concurring judge observed that the plaintiff should
have a federal cause of action, and served notice that his concurrence
in denying relief was only temporary. 50
(d) Some negative research. Though it may not be feasible to
attempt to answer the massive overall question of whether and to
what extent the exclusionary rule does deter illegal searches and
seizures by law enforcement personnel, it is possible to approach the
problem step by step from the negative side by seeking, first, to
determine what the exclusionary rule does not accomplish and,
second, to identify some negative effects that its use may entail. The
questions posed by this approach are numerous but relatively simple.
The remaining two parts pursue this twofold inquiry. Part V
examines some limitations upon the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule in various circumstances. These limitations reveal some areas
where the exclusionary rule may be ineffective and some weaknesses
that probably reduce its impact in areas where it may have effect. By
exploring what the exclusionary rule does not accomplish, this part
will define the limits of the rule. It will also suggest ways in which
the effectiveness of the rule could be enhanced. Part VI will examine
some asserted negative effects or costs entailed in the application of
the exclusionary rule. Where the assertions examined in these two
parts seem to be based upon matters of fact or where they are subject
to challenge or substantiation by factual inquiry, the discussion will
refer to some evidence on the critical facts or suggest methods of
empirical research by which such evidence could be obtained.
148 Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970).
'49 Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). Cases on the liability of police
officers for negligently causing personal injury or death are collected in 60 A.L.R.2d 873
(1958). The court's suggestion of pain and suffering damages in this case is significant since
studies have shown that in awarding damages under this heading "[t]he jury seems to be
responding not to pain as such but to the dignitary aspects of the injury .... " Blum &
Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans,
31 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 641, 673 (1964), cited in Weiler, supra note 100, at 447 n.57.
150 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718, 726 (2d Cir. 1969) (Waterman, J., concurring).
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THE DETERRENT EFFECIVENESS

OF THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

This section examines some probable limitations upon the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a means to deter illegal searches
and seizures. Some of these limitations relate only to the effect of the
rule on particular types of police behavior, while others have broader
application, challenging the whole deterrent theory of the rule. In
focusing on possible weaknesses in the exclusionary rule, this section
may provide ammunition for those who would seek to abolish or
restrict its application. But the information contained here should
also be useful for those who are interested in understanding the
rule's weaknesses in order to strengthen or supplement it with additional mechanisms for controlling official behavior.151
A.

A Sanction Limited to Evidence Offered at Trial

The salient weakness of the exclusionary rule as a device to deter
improper police behavior is that its penal effect is felt only when a
case comes. to court and there is an attempt to introduce illegally
obtained evidence to secure a conviction. Consequently, the exclusionary rule is not likely to be an effective deterrent against official
misconduct if that misconduct is not directed toward acquiring
evidence or if it is not likely to result in a prosecution. These two
limitations cover such a high proportion of law enforcement activity
that they leave relatively little latitude for the operation of the
exclusionary rule. "A great majority of the situations in which policemen intervene are not, or are not interpreted by the police to be,
criminal situations in the sense that they call for arrest with its
possible consequences of prosecution, trial and punishment."'152 And
even among the small category of arrests, less than ten per cent of the
defendants are charged with any of the seven serious offenses that
make up the F.B.I. crime index'58 and lead to the most seriously
conducted prosecutions. A large proportion of arrested persons are
released without any charges being brought. 5 4 The question suggested by the foregoing facts is how can the exclusionary rule have a
significant effect on reforming or controlling police behavior when
its only impact concerns a tiny fraction of that behavior?
151 See generally LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv. 891, 566 (1965).
152 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA-,

ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967).

Examples include

quieting noisy parties, helping drunks, returning runaways and settling family squabbles.
153 J. WILSON, VARIEnES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 6 (1968).
154 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 186-7.
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The exclusionary rule is unlikely to affect those forms of official misbehavior which the offending officer considers unlikely to result in
the acquisition of evidence that could be presented in court. Thus, it
is unlikely to deter physical abuse of persons in custody, unnecessary
destruction of property, illegal detentions (unless leading to acquisition of evidence), taking or soliciting bribes, and extorting money on
threat of arrest or other sanction. 155
On the subject of conduct likely to result in prosecution, Chief
Justice Warren made the point succinctly in Terry v. Ohio:
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting
or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal. 156
This is a familiar point. 157 Informed observers have suggested a variety
of goals or motivations other than obtaining convictions that may
prompt police arrest and search and seizure. 158 These include arrest
or confiscation as a punitive sanction (common in gambling and
liquor law violations), 15 9 arrest for the purpose of controlling prosti155 Barrett, supra note 37, at 584-5, 592-3; Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights
and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 46, 54-55. Evidence unexpectedly obtained as the fruits of such illegal conduct can of course be suppressed, Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), but that prospect is unlikely to exert a deterring
influence on law enforcement officials if they do not expect to obtain evidence when they
engage in the conduct in question.
156 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
157 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, at 488; TAsr. FORCE REPORT: TnE POLICE at 18-19, 31,
200; J. SKOLNICK, supra note 91, at 225; Allen, supra note 3, at 37-39; Barrett, supra note
155, at 54-55; LaFave & Remington, supra note 29, at 1008-11; Schaefer, supra note 24,
at 14; Comment, judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YAI.a L.J. 144, 148
(1948).
A young Vista volunteer working with juveniles in the Uptown area of Chicago gave
vivid expression to the same idea in testimony before the Bill of Rights Committee of
the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in February, 1970. After accusing police of
maintaining "a sort of reign of terror against the most innocent and worthwhile activities of any group that's young, poor, defenseless and wears their hair long," he suggested
a rule restricting "stop and frisk" practices. "But I really wonder what good a rule like
that would do," he concluded, "when there aren't any real penalties you could lay on
the cops for violating it. Suppressing the evidence of a bad bust may discourage the rotten
investigative tactics of officers who are really trying to solve crimes, but it doesn't have
the slightest effect in cramping the style of uniformed gunmen who are just out to make
life miserable for a certain class of society."
supra note 34, at chs. 21-24; LaFave, supra note 151, at 448-55;
MILLER, supra note 78, at 246-50.
19 For example, 3,719 defendants were arrested for "investigation" in Baltimore in
1964. After being held for up to three days, 98% were released without charge. TASK
158 W. LAFAvE,

J. SKOLNICK, supra note 91, at 220; F.
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tutes and transvestites, arrest of an intoxicated person for his own
safety, search for the purpose of recovering stolen property, arrest and
search and seizure for the purpose of "keeping the lid on" in a high
crime area or of satisfying public outcry for visible enforcement,
search for the purpose of removing weapons or contraband such as
narcotics from circulation, and search for weapons that might be
used against the searching officer. 160 A large proportion of police behavior is traceable to these reasons for arrest and search and seizure
and thus is not likely to be responsive to any deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.
The variety of reasons for an improper search and seizure is in
marked contrast to the limited number of reasons why police would
engage in the kind of illegal conduct that causes the exclusion of a
coerced confession or an improper lineup identification. In exceptional situations a person may be interrogated just to obtain the
recovery of stolen property, to locate a kidnapped person or to clear
a crime, all without intention of prosecuting. But the predominant
incentive for interrogation is to obtain evidence for use in court.
Consequently, police conduct in this area is likely to be responsive to
judicial rules governing the admissibility of that evidence. "There can
be no doubt," the President's Crime Commission reported, that the
Supreme Court's rulings about interrogation procedures "had much
to do with the fact that today the third degree is almost nonexistent."' 61
James Q. Wilson has observed that the problem of interrogation was
relatively easy to bring under judicial control by appellate decisions
"precisely because it was part of the crime-solving function of the
police .... ,.162 The same success may be expected for the new
THE CouRTs at 121. See also the discussion of extra-judidal punishments
in text following note 250 infra.
160 "Preventive patrol often involves aggressive action on the part of the police in
stopping persons using the streets in high-crime areas and in making searches of both
persons and vehicles ... to find and confiscate dangerous weapons and to create an
atmosphere of police omnipresence which will dissuade persons from attempting to
commit crimes because of the likelihood of their being detected and apprehended."
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 23. Thus, a 1966 Crime Commission study reported
that 12 per cent of the 224 persons frisked in high-crime neighborhoods in Boston, Chitago and Washington, D.C. were carrying guns and that another 8 per cent were carrying
knives. The legality of "a very high proportion" of these searches was considered highly
questionable. Some persons found carrying weapons were released in the field. Black &
Reiss, Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions, 2 STuDIES IN CRIME AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS § 1, at 87, 90-91 (undated); THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 152, at 94-95.
161 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 152, at 93; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
at 181.
162 J. WILSON, supra note 140, at 48. Others are less sanguine about the deterrent
success of the interrogation rules, at least as regards the Miranda warnings.
FORCE RE.PORT:

1970]

Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure

rulings on lineup identifications. But the exclusionary rule has not
been successful and is not likely to be successful in achieving a
comparable elimination of illegal arrests and searches and seizures
because the object of much of the challenged conduct is the maintenance of order rather than the prosecution of crime.
A related doubt about the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule
arises from the fact that a large majority of defendants plead guilty. 16 3
Robert Emmet Burns observes:
It is an eminently fair question to ask whether local police,
well aware of calendar turnover and voluntary guilty pleas
in urban centers, are in fact deterred or encouraged to be
fairer than otherwise. If capital punishment does not deter
an offender because it will not happen, why should court
exclusion of evidence or appellate reversal of trial decisions
deter police when ninety per cent of the time there will be
4
no trial? 0
Albert W. Alschuler points out that illegally obtained evidence contributes to a successful prosecution where the defendant pleads guilty
before litigating his motion to suppress, but the prosecution pays a
price in the form of a reduced sentence. He poses the critical question
"whether a reduction in sentence, even in a large number of cases, can
achieve a deterrent effect similar to that produced by the elimination
165
of conviction in a few."'
Empirical Research. The foregoing discussion has suggested the
hypothesis that there will be little or no deterrent effect upon police
conduct not intended to obtain evidence for use in a prosecution, and
it has given a variety of examples of such conduct. Any of these
examples could be examined by a before-after test if objective evidence is still available, or by contemporary observation of law enforcement officers in action. Even with conduct intended to result in a
prosecution, it should be possible to identify types of police behavior
or types of crime where the exclusionary rule is comparatively inef163 The proportion of defendants who plead guilty varies from 35% to 95%, depending
upon the crime charged and the practices of the particular jurisdiction. Nationally,
narcotics and weapons charges involve about 70% guilty pleas, which is about the national
average for all crimes. Figures on various crimes appear in Oaks, The Criminal Justice
Act in the Federal District Courts, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL IIGHTS, 90th CONG., 2d SEss. 288 (Comm. Print 1969) (federal court); H.
KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 20 (1966) (national averages); D. OAKs & W.
LEHMAN, supra note 73, at 59, 66 (Illinois data and national averages).
164 Bums, supra note 30, at 95-96.
165 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CGn. L. Ray. 50, 82
(1968).
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fective as a deterrent. There is a working hypothesis in the suggestion
that the exclusionary rule will be less effective in those crimes where
a comparatively high percentage of defendants plead guilty. There is
another hypothesis in the suggestion that police are less likely to be
interested in convictions and more likely to be making illegal intrusions on privacy in the so-called "victimless crimes" such as gambling,
liquor, narcotics, prostitution and sexual immorality, where the
gravity of the crime (as measured by penalties actually imposed) is
relatively insignificant and where there is public clamor for visible
enforcement. Just about half of all arrests are for crimes of this
character.166 It is in this area, Allen concludes, that "[t]he threat of
the exclusionary rule is likely to have little potency . . .1,7
". A high
proportion of motions to suppress involve such crimes.16 8
B.

Unfavorable Conditions for Deterrence

The exclusionary rule operates under conditions that are unfavorable for effective general deterrence, at least by means of direct deterrent effect. The pioneering work of Johannes Andenaes and the
writings of subsequent scholars suggest that the general deterrent
effect of legal sanctions will be affected by the following conditions.
(1) The effect will vary according to the individual's perceptions
of the risk of detection, conviction and punishment. 69
(2) The effect will vary according to the individual's perception of
70
the severity of the penalty.
(3) The effect of the legal sanction may be neutralized when the
forbidden behavior is approved by the relevant community and when
7
conviction entails no loss of prestige.' '
(4) A legal sanction is most likely to be an effective deterrent when
it is reinforced by a sense of moral obligation or an appeal to con72
science.1
(5) A legal sanction is most likely to be an effective deterrent when
166 THE CHALLENGE OF Cram,supra note 152, at 20.
167 Allen, supra note 3, at 38-89. Consistent with that suggestion, Skolnick concluded

that the exclusionary rule "seems to control police almost in direct relation to the gravity
of the crime of the suspect." J. SKoLNIcK, supra note 91, at 225.
16s See text accompanying note 69 supra.
169 Andenaes, supra note 131, at 960-4; Crampton, supra note 125, at 426-7; Zimring,

supra note 125, at pt. III, §§ la. & d.
170 Andenaes, supra note 131, at 964-70; Crampton, supra note 125, at 426-7; Zimring,
supra note 125, at pt. II, § le.
171 Andenaes, supra note 131, at 950, 959-60; Crampton, supra note 125, at 427; Zimring, supra note 125, pt. III, § Id.
172 Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 125, at 291-800. See also Andenaes, supra note 131,
at 956-9; Zimring, supra note 125, pt. III, §§ lb. & f.
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the motivation to engage in the prohibited conduct is low and when
there are readily available alternative courses of conduct to attain the
173
desired goal.
(6) If the sanction is to be effective as a general deterrent it must
74
be communicated to the target population.
(7) A final condition, not separately listed by the scholars of deterrence but worthy of special emphasis in connection with the effect of
the exclusionary rule, is the following: If a sanction is to be effective
as a deterrent, the circumstances under which it will be applied must
be stated with sufficient clarity that persons can pattern their conduct
after it.
Examined under each of the foregoing categories, the exclusionary
rule appears to be subject to serious limitations in its direct deterrent
effect upon improper police behavior. Most of the limitations are
identified in this statement by Judge (as he then was) Warren Burger:
Curiously, those in the legal world who contend most
ardently that deterrence of crime by punishment is an outmoded concept are among the most vocal in claiming a deterrent effect for the suppression of evidence. If prisons do not
deter forbidden conduct, how can we think that a policeman
will be deterred by a judicial ruling on suppression of evidence which never affects him personally, and of which he
learns, if at all, long after he has forgotten the details of the
particular episode which occasioned suppression? This is an
important issue which proponents of deterrence-by-suppres75
sion must meet; it cannot be swept under the rug.'
1. Risk of Detection, Conviction and Punishment. A prime defect

of the exclusionary rule is that police who have been guilty of improper behavior are not affected in their person or their pocketbook
by the application of the rule. The perceived risk of unwanted detection and adjudication of fault is slight. If the officer has any reason
to conceal improper behavior, the courtroom issue typically becomes
a contest of credibility that the trier of fact is likely to resolve in favor
of the officer. Moreover, as Justice Jackson once noted: "Rejection of
the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official .... -176

So far as police command control is concerned, it is a notorious fact
that police are rarely, if ever, disciplined by their superiors merely
because they have been guilty of illegal behavior that caused evidence
Crampton, supra note 125, at
Andenaes, supra note 131, at
175 Burger, supra note 56, at 11.
176 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
173

174

425; Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. III, § lb.
950, 970; Zimring, supra note 125, at pt. III, § Ic.
See generally LaFave, supra note 151.
128, 136 (1954).
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to be suppressed. As discussed more fully hereafter, 177 if an officer is
disciplined or disadvantaged because of his conduct in arrest or search
and seizure, it will be for acting unreasonably as measured by norms of
conduct other than those laid down in judicial decisions.
2. Severity of Penalty. The immediate impact of the exclusionary
rule falls not upon the police but upon the prosecutor who is attempting to obtain a conviction. The impact is misplaced. The Presidential Commission's Report on the Police observed that the prosecutor
"is not generally conceived of in this country as having overall
responsibility for the supervision of the police."' 178 The relationship is generally that of independent and coordinate authorities,
not always cooperating and sometimes even in conflict in the common
task. 179 The relationship can be explained in terms of the different
motivations of prosecutor and police. The prosecutor's dominant
career motivation is to prosecute and convict the guilty. The police,
on the other hand, have a variety of motives other than to facilitate
prosecutions. 8 0 Consequently, the exclusionary rule is well tailored
to deter the prosecutor from illegal conduct. But the prosecutor is
not the guilty party in an illegal arrest or search and seizure, and he
rarely has any measure of control over the police who are responsible.' 81 To the extent that the exclusionary rule does have any cor177 See text following note 183 supra.
178 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 30. "[N]either the police nor the prosecutor
assume that the prosecutor has the responsibility either to stimulate or to participate in
the development of administrative policies to control the wide range of police practices."
Id. at 31. Chief Justice Warren Burger has criticized what he calls the "bland assumption
by judges, especially appellate judges, that law enforcement is a monolithic governmental
unity .... " He stated that "this confusion in the judicial mind is responsible for much
of the continued vitality of the deterrence theory." Burger, supra note 56, at 12-13.
179 The President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia noted that:
[L]iaison between the police and the United States Attorney's office has been
inadequate. Few new assistants have more than a casual awareness of police
procedures, and learn these only coincidentally as they examine individual cases.
In turn, the police receive only occasional direction from the United States
Attorney on matters of such prosecution importance as confessions and search
and seizure .... Rapport is erratic; policemen attribute lost cases to excessive

prosecutive fastidiousness, and prosecutors blame police carelessness.
REPORT Or THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTrICT OF COLUxmBIA 330-1

(1966).
180 See text following note 157 supra.

181 Katz, supra note 67, at 141; Paulsen, supra note 58, at 257; Waite, Judges and the
Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169, 194 (1955). In some jurisdictions the prosecutor
does not even screen proposed prosecutions and determine what charges shall be filed.
D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, supra note 73, at 28-30 (Chicago); Meglio, Comparative Study of
the District Attorneys Office in Los Angeles and Brooklyn, 5 THE PROSECUTOR 237, 239-40

(1969) (Brooklyn).
It may or may not be coincidence that the 'police organization that has the best
reputation for observing the arrest and search and seizure rules is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which is (at least nominally) under the command control of the nation's
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rectional impact, it is not on police who deliberately engage in illegal
behavior, but "against the police department which is trying to do its
job of crime control [particularly by obtaining convictions] but is
82
overzealous in its methods."'
8. Competing Norms of Behavior. The exclusionary rule is unlikely to have a controlling effect upon a wide range of police behavior
that is violative of the rules of arrest and search and seizure because
any direct deterrent effect of the rule is neutralized by the keenly felt
needs of the situation and by the competing norms of police behavior.
Skolnick found that "norms located within police organization are
more powerful than court decisions in shaping police behavior ... ."183 Even if a police officer's conduct was illegal and
resulted in loss of a conviction, Skolnick observed that the officer
was assured of the sympathy of his superiors so long as he acted "in
,,184
conformity with administrative norms of police organization ....
A police officer will be disciplined only if he has failed to behave as a
reasonable officer should. The Crime Commission's Task Force Report
on the Police found frequent instances in which:
[A]n officer's behavior is clearly illegal or improper, but is
consistent with the routine practice of the particular agency
and is generally condoned by its administration . . . . It is,
for example, common for police officers to search the interior
of a vehicle without legal grounds in high crime-rate areas. It
is similarly common for police to search gamblers or arrest
known prostitutes without adequate grounds. Since such
actions are generally encouraged by superior officers, it is
inconceivable that the officer would be administratively criticized or disciplined upon the filing of a complaint. 8 5
High-ranking police officials in two different cities advised the author
that their officers frequently enter and search a whole dwelling or
make other illegal searches in order to recover stolen property. Officers
are never disciplined for such action because, as one said, "society has
a paramount interest in recovering stolen property." But thoughtful
police officers feel the conflict, perhaps because of the accumulative
chief prosecutor. Compare the Canadian situation discussed in text following note 113
supra.
182 Barrett, supra note 37, at 586. See also Kitch, supra note 24, at 157.
183 J. SKOLNiCx, supra note 91, at 219. See also text accompanying note 91 supra.

184 Id. at 224. Thus, Superintendent 0. W. Wilson of Chicago wrote in a department
memorandum: "I will always support the police officer who, in the performance of his
assigned tasks, exercises what he believes to be his authority in a reasonable manner."
Quoted in Caplan, The Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. CpiM. L.C. &cP.S. 803, 306 n.13 (1967).
185 TAsK FoRGcE REPORT: THE POLICE at 28-29.
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educative and moral effect of the exclusionary rule. "It is a terrible
thing," one official told the author, "when we have to break the law
to enforce the law."
Several observers have commented upon the unreality of expecting
legal rules to exert effective control over the routine conduct of an
individual officer. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Donald J. Black argue that
conflict between the appellate courts and the police over behavior
standards is inevitable since appellate court criteria for the exclusion
of evidence "articulate a moral order-a system of values and
norms---" whereas "the police are organized to articulate a behavior
system-to maintain law and order . . . , T]heir organizational
concern is less for the legitimacy of means than for the rather immediate end of enforcing behavior standards."'' 8 James Q. Wilson's
eight-city study of police behavior in the maintenance of order and
the enforcement of less serious offenses revealed that the primary
guides for a patrolman's behavior were the felt needs of the situation
and the expectations of his colleagues on the beat. The patrolman is
oriented to approach incidents that threaten order not in terms of
' s7
enforcing the law but in terms of "handling the situation."'
The individualistic, rule-oriented perspective of the courtroom is at variance with the situational, order maintenance
perspective of the patrolman. The patrolman senses this conflict without quite understanding it and this contributes to
his unease at having his judgment tested in a courtroom 88
Skolnick gives the familiar example of a police officer who makes an
illegal search that uncovers an unlawful weapon or narcotic. Even if
the evidence is suppressed in court, the officer, through the act of
retrieval, would have fulfilled his duty to confiscate illegal substances.
By failing to make the putatively "unreasonable" search, the
policeman would not only have failed to gain a conviction,
186 Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374
187 J. WILSON, supra note 140, at chs. 1, 2, 9.

ANNALS

47, 48-49 (1967).

188 Id. at 31-32. A Crime Commission study of the attitudes of 204 police officers in
high-crime precincts in Boston, Chicago and Washington provides evidence of the differ.
ence in outlook. Over half complained that Supreme Court decisions created problems
in the search of persons or the seizure of evidence. An even 90% stated that the Supreme
Court "had gone too far" in making rules favoring and protecting criminal offenders.
Almost all of these cited one of the following reasons for their opinion: curtails effectiveness of police work, helps criminals or fails to protect society or victims of crime. A quarter
of the officers interviewed stated that changes in courts or court decisions was the most
important thing that could be done to reduce crime in their district. Reiss, Career
Orientations, Job Satisfaction, and the Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems by
Police Officers, 2 STumEs IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS
§ 2, at 68, 110, 112-3 (1967).
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but would also have missed collecting objects or substances
regarded as dangerous. In the policeman's view, only good
can come out of a search legally defined as "unreasonable,"
provided the search jibes with the normative assumptions of
the police organization about reasonableness. 8 9
It is said that the courts have not been sufficiently informed and
sensitive to the practical needs of law enforcement. 9 0 However that
may be, it seems likely that judicial review by means of the exclusionary rule does not have a reforming effect over competing norms of
police behavior in many areas. The operation of the rule is not suited
to that purpose. The rule arises out of a review of the conduct of an
individual officer, not a challenge to a policy of the department. The
court is generally unaware of the relevant department policy, and by
no stretch of the imagination can it be said to have reviewed it. And
the ultimate sanction, loss of the prosecution, affects the department
even less than the officer himself.' 9 '
4. Reinforcement by a. Sense of Moral Obligation. It should be
apparent from the foregoing discussion that the exclusionary rule is
not reinforced by a comprehensive sense of moral obligation, at least
as regards its potential for direct deterrence. Over the long term,
however, the moral and educative force of the exclusionary rule may
wear away at the competing norms so that the rule may ultimately
be reinforced by a sense of moral obligation.
5. Motivation for ProhibitedAct. The strength of the motivation to
J. SKOLNICK, supra note 91, at 220.
190 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME at 94. Speaking from the findings of the American Bar
189

Foundation's survey and from their own observation, LaFave and Remington declare:
"Hearings on motions to suppress evidence allegedly obtained by illegal police investigative practices are often conducted in a manner not calculated to encourage careful
consideration of the factual and legal bases for the motion....
"As a consequence, trial courts rarely are given an accurate or complete picture of the
law enforcement practice challenged by the motion to suppress."
LaFave & Remington, supra note 29, at 1003-4.
191 The Crime Commission's Task Force Report on The Police describes the problem
in this way:
Most often, the process of judicial review is seen as a decision about the
propriety of the actions of the individual officer rather than a review of departmental administrative policy. Judges seldom ask for and, as a consequence, are
not informed as to whether there is a current administrative policy. And, if there
is one, they seldom ask whether the officer's conduct in the particular case
conformed to or deviated from the policy. As a result, police are not encouraged
to articulate and defend their policy; the decision of the trial judge is not even
communicated to the police administrator; and the prevailing police practice
often continues unaffected by the decision of the trial judge.
TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 31. The Report urges that conformity to approved
standards of behavior is more likely to be attained by changes in department rules, so it
urges courts to place greater emphasis on reviewing departmental policies that may be
responsible for the behavior that causes evidence to be suppressed. Id. at 20, 32-33.
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engage in the prohibited conduct and the availability of alternative
ways to attain the desired goal will of course vary widely. Sometimes
there will be a strong motivation, such as that provided by the officer's
instinct of self-preservation in the search for a weapon or his desire
to win plaudits for the recovery of stolen property that can be
retrieved only by an illegal search. Sometimes alternative courses will
be available, such as easy access to a warrant; but sometimes-if
responsible police officers are to be believed-there is no practical
way to proceed except upon the illegal course. This subject does not
admit of easy generalization, except that there will be circumstances
when the conditions for the general deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule are very negative.
6. Effective Communication. To be an effective general deterrent
the sanction and the reasons for the sanction must be communicated
to the target population. There is reason to believe that the channels
of communication between police and courts and prosecutors are such
as to minimize the deterrent effect of the rule. On the basis of the
American Bar Foundation's field research survey of the administration
of criminal justice, supplemented by their own observation, Wayne R.
LaFave and Frank J. Remington give the following description:
Nor are police well informed about the trial judge's decision
or its legal basis. The trial judge seldom explains his decision
in a way likely to be understood by the police officer, and the
prosecutor assigned to the case rarely assumes it to be his duty
to inform the police department of the meaning of the decision or of its intended impact upon current police practice.
The individual officer whose case has been lost is not expected to report the reason for the decision to his superiors.
Some decisions, usually those the officer believes to be particularly outrageous, may be passed on to other officers by
word of mouth, but they often become distorted in the
retelling. If a 'court officer' is assigned to the court by the
police department, his responsibilities do not include reporting the judge's rulings on police conduct. Obviously,
police cannot be affirmatively influenced to change their
methods of law enforcement by the exclusion of evidence
when there is no communication to them of why the decision
was made. 192
This description is confirmed in all respects by the author's summer
1964 observations while working as an Assistant States Attorney as192 LaFave & Remington, supra note 29, at 1005; LaFave, supra note 151, at 415-21.
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signed to the Chicago courts where most suppression hearings were
103
held.
7. Clarity of the Rule. The deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is also dependent upon whether the arrest and search and
seizure rules that it is supposed to enforce are stated with sufficient
clarity that they can be understood and followed by common ordinary
police officers. This point applies not only to the direct deterrent
effect of the rule, but also to its longer range moral and educative
effect. If the rules are a clarion call for protecting the rights of the
individual, then the trumpet gives an uncertain sound. 19 4 Though undoubtedly clear in some areas of police behavior, the rules are
notoriously complex in others. As one critic observed with acid hyperbole, they "would not deter or enlighten a policeman in Gary with a
Ph.D. who was going to law school at night."' 9 5 At the very least it
can be said that in terms of the complexity of the rules, the area of
arrest and search and seizure is not a favorable one for a deterrent
sanction to be effective.
The point of this section is not that the exclusionary rule can have
no direct deterrent effect. There are probably situations where it
deters. In crimes such as homicide, where prosecution is almost a
certainty and where public interest and awareness are high, the conditions for deterrence are optimal and the exclusionary rule is likely to
affect police behavior. 9 6 The point of this section is, rather, that there
are situations-and there are good reasons to believe that these situa103 In the author's observation, Assistant States Attorneys rarely communicated with
individual police officer witnesses to explain what they had done wrong and why their
evidence was being suppressed. Inquiries by the author found a significant fraction of
patrolmen who were leaving the courtroom confused and bitter about the action taken,

attributing it to venality of the judges or prosecutor (or both), and having no idea
whatever of how to modify their own conduct to avoid a repetition. (Such misunderstandings wer not observed in experienced detectives.) The police sergeants assigned to
each court stated that they had no responsibility to (and did not) inform the Department
of instances when a police officer had violated the arrest and search and seizure rules. They
did not discuss the reasons with the individual officer or relay any impressions to the
Training Division.

194 "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the
battle?" I Cor. 14:8.
105 Burns, supra note 30, at 100. Sceptics on the issue of complexity should consult,
inter alia, LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not
Run Smooth," 1966 ILL. L.F. 255.
190 Thus, after weeks of observing police in action, Skolnick concluded that "the

exclusionary principle puts pressure on the police to work within the rules in those cases
where prosecution is contemplated." He also concluded that "the rule seems to control
police almost in direct relation to the gravity of the crime of the suspect." J. SKoLNICK,
supra note 91, at 224, 225.
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tions comprise a majority of law enforcement activities involving
arrest and search and seizure-where conditions militate against the
1 97
direct deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
Empirical Research. The foregoing discussion involved a large

variety of factual questions subject to empirical examination. Most are
set out here in outline form.
(A) What penalizing effect does the application of the exclusionary
rule have upon an individual law enforcement officer?
(1) Is the mere fact of exclusion looked on by the officer as a
penalty upon him, by rendering his enforcement efforts fruitless or
by officially declaring that he has wasted his time in court? This
question might be explored by some form of attitude research.
(2) What, if any, disciplinary or administrative review or police
command pressure is applied to correct the behavior of an officer
who occasionally or repeatedly engages in violations of the arrest
and search and seizure rules that result in suppression of evidence
in court? Police records would reveal formal disciplinary incidents
and routine procedures for administrative review, but the important informal pressures probably could be ascertained only by
careful observation or by frank disclosures by police personnel. 198
(B) If an application of the exclusionary rule brings pressure on the
prosecutor, is the prosecutor in a position to pressure and does he in
fact pressure the police to correct the improper practice? 199
supra note 91, at 224, concludes:
Consequently, all these reasons-the norm of police alertness; the requirement
that police confiscate illegal substances; the tendency toward a presumption of
the legality of the search once the illegal substance is found; the fact that in a
small pinch the policeman is usually not interested in an arrest but in creating
an informant; the fact that the defense will be impressed by the presence of
incriminating evidence; the sympathy of police superiors so long as policemen
act in conformity with administrative norms of police organization; the difficulty
of proving civil suits for false arrest; the denial of fact by the exclusionary rule;
and the problematic character of what behavior is permitted when justification
may appear to a court to be "uniquely present"-militate against the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. In short the norms of the police are fundamentally
pragmatic. Since the policeman has everything to gain and little to lose when he
uses the 'reasonableness of the search and seizure' standard in small cases, he
does so, even though this is not the prevailing legal standard.
But compare Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 703, 712, for a theoretical discussion upon which one may conclude
that police officers are among the groups most likely to be deterred by legal sanctions.
198 "[1]n the absence of better information, even unverified gossip can sometimes serve
a useful purpose. Its utility lies in isolating potential problems and in guiding analysis,
rather than in measuring the extent of the problems it suggests." Alschuler, supra note
165, at 52 n.15.
199 See generally Katz, supra note 67, at 142.
197 J. SKOLNICK,
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(1) Does the prosecutor have any formal authority over the police?
This question can be answered by studying the formal or legal
structure of government. In addition, one could usefully compare
the command relationship between prosecutor and police in Canada
200
and other Commonwealth countries.
(2) What, if any, indirect authority does the prosecutor have, or try
to exercise, over the police?
(3) How frequently do prosecutors institute criminal proceedings
against police officers for offenses (such as battery, breaking and
entering or trespass) committed in the course of an improper search
and seizure? This could be determined from official records. In
addition, one might also compare the record of prosecutors in common law jurisdictions like Canada that rely on methods other than
the exclusionary rule for control of police behavior.
(C) How effectively are the applications of the exclusionary rule communicated to the erring officer and to the target population that is
supposed to be the object of its general deterrent effect?
(1) What, if any, measures are actually taken to assure that the
officer whose conduct has caused the suppression understands where
he erred and how he could avoid repetition of the error?
(2) What, if any, measures are taken to keep police department
command personnel informed of the type and extent of arrest and
search and seizure violations that cause suppression of evidence? To
what extent are these facts and related departmental instructions
communicated to line officers?
(D) To what extent is the impact of the exclusionary rule neutralized
by competing norms of police behavior (formal or informal)? The
Skolnick, Wilson and LaFave books and the Crime Commission's
Task Force Report on the Police have already done considerable observation in this area. No better method appears at present. There is
need for further work to identify and establish the frequency of police
practices that are both conventional and contrary to the rules of arrest
and search and seizure.
(E) In what types of situations and to what extent is the effect of the
exclusionary rule reduced by strong motivations to engage in the
illegal behavior and by the absence or believed absence of an acceptable alternative to attain the desired goal? This is another subject for
200 See text following note 113 supra.
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which the best available method of inquiry appears to be intensive
20
participant observation. .
C.

Effect of the *StandingRequirement
The direct deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule may be reduced
by limitations on the scope of the rule. Some of these limitations have
recently been removed,202 but an important one remains. Courts
employ the exclusionary rule only at the behest of a person who has
"standing" to make the motion to suppress. A person has standing only
if he was aggrieved by the unlawful search and seizure, such as one
whose person was searched, whose property was seized, or who was a
rightful occupant of the place where it was seized. 20 3 A person has no
standing to invoke the exclusionary rule if the evidence was obtained
through an unlawful invasion of the rights of some other person (such
as a co-conspirator or accomplice), even though the evidence is being
20 4
used to attempt to convict him of a crime.

The standing limitation is inconsistent with both of the asserted
reasons for the exclusionary rule, the so-called "imperative of judicial
integrity" and the desire to deter the police.21 5 If the exclusionary
rule were seriously bent on deterring the police or on avoiding judicial
involvement in illegal behavior it would exclude all illegally seized
evidence, without inquiry into whose property or personal rights
were violated. Upon this reasoning numerous writers have urged abolition of the standing requirement, 2 6 but thus far only the California
Supreme Court has heeded their urgings. 207 The United States Supreme Court recently adhered to its standing rule after thorough
briefing and argument in a case where a defendant sought to exclude
wiretap evidence obtained by illegally invading the rights of other
201 See text accompanying note 183 supra.
202 In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Supreme Court upset the "silver
platter" doctrine, which had permitted federal officers to use evidence obtained illegally
by state officers. More recently, the Supreme Court set aside earlier holdings that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
203 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); T. ABB or, et al., supra note 1, at ch. 4;
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333
(1970); Comment, supra note 20. Standing will be assumed if the defendant would have
to prove his guilt of the crime in order to establish his standing. Id. An example would
be narcotics seized and intended to be used as evidence in a prosecution for possession of
narcotics.
204 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); authorities cited note 203 supra.
205 Allen, supra note 11, at 22; Comment, supra note 20, at 347, 349, 358.
205 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 11, at 22; Traynor, supra note 25, at 335; authorities
cited in Comment, supra note 20, at 343 n.8.
207 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) (Traynor, J.).
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persons. The opinion in Alderman v. United States20 8 displays a clear
unwillingness to follow the exclusionary rule to its logical conclusion
when this would further encroach upon the public interest in having
convictions or acquittals upon the basis of all evidence that exposes
the truth.
The necessity for [the standing rule] was not eliminated by
recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim of the rule.
[Cites Linkletter and Elkins cases.] Neither those cases nor
any others hold that anything which deters illegal searches is
thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment. The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient
to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though
the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We
adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the
additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants would justify further encroachment upon
the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and
having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth.20 9
The Supreme Court's adherence to the standing limitation continues
an unstable truce between two concepts that are logically at war with
one another. In the long run one or the other will probably give way.
In the meantime, the exclusionary rule may have diminished deterrent
effect against illegal searches and seizures directed at property not
210
belonging to or in the possession of the prospective defendant.
Empirical Research. Apart from one relatively unimportant inquiry,211 the standing exception does not seem to be a fruitful subject
for empirical research. It might be useful to inquire into whether and
the extent to which police deliberately take advantage of the standing
208 394 US. 165 (1969).

209 Id. at 174-5.
210 The exclusionary rule is also unlikely to discourage invasions of privacy by private
parties, since the Supreme Court has made no move to modify rulings that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the use of evidence obtained by private parties under
circumstances that would have been an unreasonable search and seizure if obtained by
government officers. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
211 The recent adoption of the exclusionary rule for civil forfeiture proceedings (note
202 supra) offers an opportunity for a relatively current before-after study of the deterrent capacity of the rule. The object would be to determine what, if any, changes in the
degree of adherence to search and seizure rules in civil forfeiture matters followed adoption of the exclusionary rule. Forfeiture proceedings are probably limited to a few
crimes, of which smuggling and narcotics violations are probably the most prominent.
The inquiry could include an examination of the frequency and pattern of such pro-

ceedings and their relationship to any criminal prosecutions against the same parties.
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loophole to obtain evidence that can be used in court even though
acquired by illegal means. If the police were measurably less inhibited
in this area than where there was standing, then this would tend to
confirm the deterrent capacity of the exclusionary rule. It seems doubtful that such confirmatory evidence could be obtained. Most searches
take place prior to the filing of criminal charges, before the police
knov who is and who is not to be a defendant in a particular criminal
proceeding. As a practical matter, it is therefore unlikely that the
standing rules have measurable effect upon police adherence to the
arrest and search and seizure rules.
VI.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

This part will discuss some possible negative effects of the exclusionary rule. If these negative effects can be substantiated, they represent disadvantages or costs of the use of the exclusionary rule, whether
or not the rule achieves its purpose of discouraging improper behavior
by the police.
A.

Nothing for the Innocent, but Freedom for the Guilty

In terms of direct corrective effect, the exclusionary rule only
benefits a person incriminated by illegally obtained evidence. It does
nothing to recompense the injury suffered by the victim of an illegal
search that turns up nothing incriminating. Justice Robert Jackson
expressed the point vividly:
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrongdoing official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrongdoing defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one
lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It
protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are
21 2
the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.
This point and its corollaries have often been urged in opposition
to the exclusionary rule. Wigmore remarked upon how the exclusionary rules "serve neither to protect the victim nor to punish the offender
but rather to compensate the guilty victim by acquittal and to punish
the public by unloosing the criminal in their midst .... ,213 He also
212 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954). See also Jackson, J., dissenting in
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30
(1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
213 8 WIGMORE ON EvmDFaNc § 2184, at 51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961). See also Wilson,
Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 175, 177 (1968).
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complained that the rule compels courts to exchange the certainty of
conviction for the possibility of protecting individuals by improving
police practices. Monrad Paulsen has commented on the "startling
result achieved under the rule: to deter the police both the guilty
defendant and the law-breaking officer go unpunished." 214
Francis A. Allen has argued that complaints about the exclusionary
rule freeing the guilty seem to be "less an assault on the exclusionary
rule than upon the validity of the substantive right sought to be protected by constitutional provisions forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures." 215 But it is surely not at odds with complete devotion
to the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure to urge that
the exclusionary rule is deficient in its failure to furnish direct protection to the innocent as well as to the guilty.
Monrad Paulsen has capsulized the second half of this argument in
his statement that "[t]he rule destroys respect for law because it provides the spectacle of the courts letting the guilty go free." 216 This
spectacle is bound to arouse the instinctive resentment that Edmund
Cahn has called "the sense of injustice." It parallels two of the illustrations he provides:
[I]nequalities arbitrarily created arouse the sense of injustice,
because equal treatment of those similarly situated with respect to the issue before the court is a deep implicit expectation of the legal order . . . . What it [the sense of injustice]

cannot stomach

guilty .. ..217

is

the use of law

to raise up the

An application of the exclusionary rule to an improper search and
seizure is probably more vulnerable to a complaint of "freeing the
guilty" than the exclusion of an improperly obtained confession or
eyewitness identification. Physical evidence is no less reliable when
illegally obtained. The nature of burglary tools, blood stains, or white
powder in a glassine wrapper is not changed by the circumstances of
their acquisition. In contrast, identifications obtained by faulty lineup
214 Paulsen, supra note 58, at 256. Alfred Hill uses this shortcoming as a basis for
suggesting greater flexibility in the means of enforcing the underlying constitutional
right: "If the other remedies are as ineffective as claimed, this means that innocent
victims of illegal searches and seizures are now substantially without recourse. Accordingly, there would be value in a new remedial 'mix' which, without overall loss of
deterrence, operates so as to produce benefits for the innocent." Hill, supra note 25, at
184-5 n.17.
215 Allen, supra note 11, at 19.

216 Paulsen, supra note 58, at 256.
217 E. CAHN, THE SENSE oF INjusmcE 14, 17 (Midland ed. 1964). See also Andenaes,
General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Clam. L.C. & P.S. 176, 183-4 (1952).
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procedures are of doubtful reliability. So are confessions obtained by
coercive methods, though the Supreme Court no longer relies on that
rationale and administers a rule that excludes confessions even if of
proven reliability. 218 In addition, under current law enforcement
methods, evidence obtained by a search is likely to be vital to conviction in most types of crimes where searches are commonly involved
(notably gambling, narcotics and weapons). Confessions are generally
less vital. 219 Thus, the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained by improper search or seizure is specially vulnerable to the
criticism of freeing the guilty because it excludes reliable (and often
practically conclusive) evidence of guilt, and it frequently results in
the immediate termination of the prosecution.
The most emphatic polemic on this point is that of the then Judge
Warren E. Burger. After complaining that the important reasons
underlying the exclusionary rule "are almost beyond comprehension
to most laymen, including most police officers," he contrasted what
they could observe about its effects:
The operation of the Suppression Doctrine unhappily
brings to the public gaze a spectacle repugnant to all decent
people-the frustration of justice .

. .

. If a majority-or

even a substantial minority-of the people in any given community . . . come to believe that law enforcement is being

frustrated by what laymen call 'technicalities,' there develops
a sour and bitter feeling that is psychologically and sociologically unhealthy .

. .

. I do not challenge these rules of law

[applying the suppression doctrine]. But I do suggest that we
may have come the full circle from the place where Brandeis
stood, and that a vast number of people are losing respect for
law and the administration of justice because they think that
the Suppression Doctrine is defeating justice. That much of
this reaction is due to lack of understanding does not mean
we can ignore it ....
The public has accepted-largely on faith in the Judiciary
-the distasteful results of the Suppression Doctrine; but the
wrath of public opinion may descend alike on police and
218 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224, 239 (1969). Other differences between
the police conduct involved in confessions and in search and seizures are discussed in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 684-5 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and in Allen, supra
note 3, at 29-32.
219 For evidence on the dispositive effect of motions to suppress see text at note 72

supra. High police officials in several areas advised the author that under present
practice they rarely make any attempt to interrogate defendants to obtain confessions.
A 1956-66 study in the District of Columbia showed that there were no ascertainable
differences in conviction rates between cases where the defendant had given a statement
and those where he had not. CRIME IN THE DisTmCr op COLUmBiA, supra note 179, at 605-8.
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judges if we persist in the view that suppression is a solution.
At best it is a necessary evil and hardly more than a manifestation of sterile judicial indignation even in the view of
well motivated and well informed laymen. We can well
ponder whether any community is entitled to call itself an
'organized society' if it can find no way to solve this problem
220
except by suppression of truth in the search for truth.
Empirical Research. The assertion that the exclusionary rule makes
no direct effort to recompense the innocent is axiomatic and requires
no empirical demonstration.
There are several matters for factual inquiry in the argument that
the rule diminishes respect for law by the spectacle of the courts letting
the guilty go free. First, is it fair to assume that most defendants who
succeed in having evidence suppressed are in fact guilty? A study and
classification of the type of evidence actually suppressed in various
kinds of crimes and a judgment about the likelihood of obtaining a
conviction with and without this evidence would be helpful in answering this question.
Second, the question of the effect of this "spectacle" on the public
image of the courts and on the elusive concept of "respect for law" is
appropriate for study. There have been several public opinion surveys
that disclosed considerable public dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court's use of "technicalities" to free guilty persons, 221 but there is
ample scope and need for further inquiry.
B. Fostering False Testimony by the Police
Skolnick's observations and the Columbia study both yield evidence
of deliberately false testimony by the police. 222 High-ranking police
officers have admitted to the author that some experienced officers will
"twist" the facts in order to prevent suppression of evidence and re220 Burger, supra note 56, at 12, 22, 23. Judge David A. Pine made similar arguments
for the minority in the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTuar
OF COLUMBIA 872-3 (1966). After stating that the tenor of some appellate decisions may
be among the indirect causative factors of crime, he explained: "These court decisions
...have created, in my opinion, a climate hospitable to the belief that punishment of
the guilty is far from certain and may be avoided by technicalities and loopholes in the
law. ... I believe that when certainty of punishment is lacking by reason of technicalities, without regard to guilt, its prophylactic effect is substantially lessened, and the
commission of crime is encouraged. Indeed, it is axiomatic that when law enforcement is
weak and vacillating, disrespect for the law ensues, and crime begins to flourish."
221 E.g., Reiss, Public Perceptions and Recollections about Crime, Law Enforcement,
and CriminalJustice, 1 STUDIES IN CaME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN
AREAS § I, at 81-85 (1967); Majority Say Courts 'Too Soft' on Criminals, THE GALLup
REPORT, March 3, 1968.
222 See text accompanying notes 85 & 91 supra.
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lease of persons whom they know to be guilty. To use the words of
one command level officer, the policeman is "programmed to respond
so as to legalize an arrest." To the extent that police officers avoid
the suppression of evidence by deliberate false testimony about the
circumstances of arrest or search and seizure, the exclusionary rule
not only fails to achieve its own objectives, it also corrupts law enforcement personnel and degrades the whole system of criminal
justice.
Empirical Research. The examination of this effect will be complicated by the fact that police personnel will hesitate to cooperate since
the facts being sought may discredit law enforcement agencies and
expose individual officers to criminal liability. A few possible methods
of inquiry and some information gathered by the author are described
below.
1. Skolnick's work has shown that an observer who spends enough
time with the police will have valuable insights of his own and may
also, by winning confidence, be able to obtain disclosures that are
unavailable to short term outside interviewers. The difficulty with this
method is that it yields data that is difficult to quantify. It can determine whether or not some police twist the facts in some suppression
hearings and it can identify some circumstances where this occurs,
but it is unlikely to yield acceptably accurate information on the frequency of the practice.
2. The Columbia study demonstrated how information could be
obtained by comparing changes in the reasons police gave for making
arrests before and after adoption of the exclusionary rule. The diffi223
culties with this method have already been discussed.
3. Another indirect approach is suggested by Skolnick's observation
that the police fabricate probable cause when they feel incapable of
literal compliance with the arrest and search and seizure rules and
therefore feel they must reconstruct the facts rather than allow the
offender to escape punishment. This suggests that the situations where
police fabrication is most likely to occur could be identified by the
inquiry, suggested earlier, 224 which would identify the arrest and search
and seizure rules that the police consider most burdensome or the
factual situations or crimes where they feel the rules to be most
inhibiting.
4. It might be possible to obtain police cooperation for one type of
interviewing that could yield useful data. Police officers who have
made numerous arrests for a type of crime that often involves motions
223 See note 88 and text accompanying note 136 supra.
224 See text accompanying note 141 supra.
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to suppress could be shown a list of possible factual situations that
could result in arrest without warrant, and asked to estimate the
proportion of their own arrests involving each type of situation. 225
After this information was gathered from an officer, the researcher
could examine the police reports and court files in all cases within a
particular period involving this particular officer, and compare the
profile of facts set forth in those files with the profile of facts described
by the officer. Significant disparities may indicate falsification of
testimony, and analysis may indicate even the patterns of falsification.
5. Another method is available if a researcher can win the cooperation 'of police supervisory personnel. An experienced officer could
examine the testimony given in court suppression hearings or the
account recorded in official police arrest reports in a large number of
cases involving a particular charge and estimate the proportion and
identify the types of twisting of facts in those cases. Experienced police
officers have advised the author that they felt they could do this with
considerable accuracy, since instances of fabrication fall into relatively
familiar patterns in various offenses, and an experienced officer can
226
recognize those patterns.
6. If assured anonymity, ranking police officers with sufficient field
experience may be willing to make quantitative estimates of the
extent of police fabrication and describe the circumstances in which
it occurs.
One official did this for the author. After many requests and a prolonged series of conferences, a command level official from a large metropolitan police department gave the author the following description
of the nature and extent of police "twisting" of facts in suppression
hearings, based on his observation. Fabrication occurs in two types of
situations. First, where a patrolman has made an on-view arrest and
officers of a special detail can reach the scene before he has submitted
his written report, they assist him in submitting a report that will not
prevent a conviction under some rule of an appellate court. The official
gave this example: Suppose a patrolman had pursued a person whom
he had seen leaving the scene of a crime, he lost sight of him for a
minute's time, and then he discovered him hiding in an obscure loca225 For example, the factual classifications used in the Columbia study, text accompanying note 85 supra, would be suitable for narcotics arrests. The question should make
clear that the desired answer is what actually happened, whether or not the true facts
came out in court. The officer would not be asked how he or his fellow arresting officer
testified in court, or about the names of defendants in any case or group of cases.
226 For example, one high-ranking police official told the author that his officers
"almost invariably lie about [their conformity with] the no-knock rule [which requires an
announcement of authority and purpose before forcing entry in a private dwelling]
because it affects their personal safety."
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tion. The patrolman's report would be prepared to contain the words
"never losing sight of the defendant .

. . ."

The officer estimated that

this type of twisting of facts occurred in about one-third of the cases
where special detail officers assisted patrolmen with their reports.
The second type is a 'direct fabrication of probable cause for an
arrest and search. The police stop and search a motor vehicle and its
occupants. If they discover the proceeds or implements of a crime,
such as stolen goods, burglary tools or a weapon, they "hang a traffic
offense on him afterward to ice it up, and they say the [evidence] was
in plain view on the floor when it was really under the seat." The
official stated that if the defendant is a known professional thief, this
type of fabrication happens about 98 per cent of the time. (He estimated that professional thieves comprise about 20 per cent of the
on-view arrests.) If the defendant is not a professional thief, the facts
22 7
are "rarely" twisted in this manner.

7. In defense of law enforcement personnel, it is fair to add that
what appears as fabrication to a layman may in reality be a policeman's
honest perception of facts, viewed in the light of his trained observation and intuition. This observation might be tested by showing a
movie of an arrest-type situation to laymen and to trained police
officers and comparing what each observed. It is possible that entirely
without conscious twisting of the facts, the officers may observe more
facts that contribute to a finding of probable cause for arrest than the
laymen.
C.

Delay and Diversion from the Question of Guilt or Innocence
It is said that the exclusionary rule hampers the administration of
justice by delaying a criminal proceeding and by diverting its focus
from the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Monrad Paulsen summarized this negative effect:
The [exclusionary] rule attempts to redress a violation of
law without the time-honored method of direct complaint
227 Cf. J. SKoLNicK, supra note 91, at 215: "[]he policeman . . . finds it necessary
to construct an ex post facto description of the preceding events so that these conform to
legal arrest requirements, whether in fact the events actually did so or not at the time
of the arrest."
The official who made the above disclosures stated that the kind of twisting of testimony described above was never done to "get" a person who was innocent, or to convict
any person about whose innocence there was any doubt. He further observed that professional criminals hire expensive counsel, rarely plead guilty, are exceedingly difficult to

convict, and get comparatively short sentences. In contrast, the "little guy" who is
arrested for the same crime is typically young, unable to afford good counsel, easy to
persuade to plead guilty, and likely to receive a longer sentence. He observed that the
,police conduct he described helps to rectify that discrimination.
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and trial on a carefully defined issue. The procedure looking
toward exclusion of evidence interrupts, delays, and confuses
the main issue at hand-the trial of the accused. The principal proceeding may be turned into a trial of the police
228
rather than of the defendant.
These objections are familiar ones. Wigmore made them, and so have
others.2 29 "To the patrolman," James Q. Wilson has observed, in describing tensions between police and judges and lawyers, "it appears
that he and not the defendant is on trial. ' 230 A criminal prosecution of
one person is at least an indirect and awkward forum for inquiring into
the behavior of some other person, a police officer, with a view to punishing him or creating some deterrent against similar conduct in the
future. And there is something anomalous if not downright distasteful
in the spectacle of a judicial officer engaging in what Chief Justice
Burger has sternly characterized as the "suppression of truth in the
231
search for truth."
EmpiricalResearch. The factual questions under this point are the
extent to which criminal proceedings are delayed, diverted or rendered
less efficient by motions to suppress or other proceedings to implement
the exclusionary rule. There are ample opportunities for reliable and
relatively simple empirical research on these questions. Caution must
be exercised in generalizing from such research, however, since these
are matters on which differences in the criminal justice systems of
different areas can have a considerable effect on the outcome of the
research. For example, the exclusionary rule's potential for delay and
diversion would seem to be greater in a system like Chicago's, where
the search and seizure issues are almost invariably litigated in court,
than in a system like the District of Columbia's where prosecutors
review and screen out the most egregious cases in advance of court
hearing. The Chicago data set out below is not tendered as typical of
courts generally, but only as expressive of the probable upper limit of
delay and diversion at this stage of the criminal justice system.
1. Time Spent on Motions to Suppress. How much courtroom time
is spent on motions to suppress in various types of crime? What fraction of the total courtroom time is spent in this manner? Tables 10
and 11 show the time spent on motions to suppress in the two municipal branches that hear about 80 per cent of the motions to suppress
228

Paulsen, supra note 58, at 256-7.
213, at 51-52; Barrett, supra note 37, at 591.
J. WItSON, supra note 140, at 52.

229 WioGoRE, supra note
230

231 Quoted in text at note 220 supra.
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in Chicago. 232 The Narcotics branch receives all Chicago narcotics
offenses (about 60 per cent of its cases fit in this category) and all
other offenses, whatever their nature, that involve defendants with a
background of narcotics offenses. The Rackets branch is assigned all
gambling cases (about one-third of its business), a high proportion of
the weapons cases (about one-third of its business), and a variety of
other offenses, predominantly disorderly conduct and theft. The following data was gathered by an observer who made one week's continuous observation with a stop watch in each courtroom.
It appears from Tables 10 and 11 that motions to suppress accounted for 20 per cent of the courtroom time in the Rackets branch
and 34 per cent of the courtroom time in the Narcotics branch. The
actual time expended amounted to about 13 hours per week. If this
total is increased by one-fourth for the proportion of motions to suppress heard in other courtrooms, then the total time expended on
motions to suppress is about 5 per cent of the total time expended in
all fourteen municipal department courtrooms that hear misdemeanors
and hold preliminary hearings in felonies in Chicago. If the hours of
the Criminal Division judges holding trials in felony cases are considered, the total is about 3 per cent. Either figure is a paltry proportion of the total courtroom time devoted to criminal cases in Chicago.
Considered only against the time spent on particular crimes, the
motion-to-suppress time is of course much more significant. The 20
per cent figure is probably a good measure of the fractional time spent
on motions to suppress in weapons and gambling cases, since those
two categories comprise about equal proportions of the docket in
Rackets court, and there were motions to suppress in about the same
proportion of cases in each category. The proportion of total courtroom time devoted to narcotics cases that is spent on motions to suppress is probably higher than the 34 per cent figure for the whole
Narcotics branch. This is because there is a materially higher proporAn examination of all motions to suppress disposed of during twelve sample days
in 1969 in all 14 Chicago municipal department courtrooms hearing criminal cases
revealed the following:
Motions to Suppress in Chicago During Twelve
Sample Days in 1969
Per cent
Number
52
341
Motions in the Branch 27 (Rackets)
29
186
(Narcotics)
57
Motions in the Branch
Motions in all other Branches of the
19
122
Municipal Department in Chicago
1
Motions in the Criminal Division (Felony)
232

Totals
Source and sample days: Same as Table 3.
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TABLE 10
DURING WEK IN BRANCH 57 (NARcoTics)

OF CIRCUIT COURT IN CHICAGO (IN MINUTES)

Activity
Bond & Continuances
Motions to Suppress
Probable Cause Hearing
Trial of Misdemeanor
Other
Total

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thur.

Fri.

Total

90
84
26
51
31

65
108
37
19
24

74
72
35
83
31

60
64
74
25
43

75
133
5
34
27

364
461
177
212
156

27
34
13
15
11

282

253

295

266

274

1370

100

Per cent

Period: Jan. 15 through Jan. 23, 1970; Judge Fred G. Suria, Jr. Data gathered by Kent
Madsen, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

TABLE 11
COURTROOM TIME DURING WEEK IN BRANCH 27 ("RAcKE-s")
OF CIRCUIT COURT IN CHICAGO (IN MINUTES)
Activity

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thur.

Bond & Continuances
Motions to Suppress
Probable Cause Hearing
Trial of Misdemeanor
Other

60
39
10
102
48

92
73
0
154
28

32
95
15
237
36

86
84
3
52
15

54
13
0
98
68

324
304
28
643
195

22
20
2
43
13

Total

259

347

415

240

233

1494

100

Fri.

Total Per cent

Period: Jan. 26 through Jan. 30, 1970; Mon., Wed. & Thur. data for main courtroom,
Judge Paul F. Gerrity; Tues. & Fri. data for rear courtroom, Judge Lawrence Genesen.

tion of motions to suppress in narcotics cases than in the other cate233
gories of business heard in this court.

In sum, more than one-third of the courtroom time spent on narcotics offenses in Chicago is devoted to hearings on motions to suppress. The comparable figure for gambling and weapons cases is about
one-fifth. Since these three offenses account for about 80 per cent of
the motions to suppress in Chicago (Table 3), it is unlikely that there
is any other category of crime where motions to suppress occupy more
than a negligible proportion of the total courtroom time spent on the
offense. And the motion to suppress accounts for no more than about
3 per cent of the total courtroom time devoted to criminal cases in
Chicago.
2. The Dispositive Effect of Motions to Suppress. One measure of
the extent to which the motion to suppress diverts a criminal proceeding from the central question of the guilt or innocence of the
233 There were motions to suppress in 34% of the narcotics cases and in only 7% of
the other cases disposed in the Narcotics branch on these sample days.
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defendant is the extent to which the granting of motions to suppress
results in final disposition of the charges in various offenses. Where the
proportion is relatively high for a particular crime, the prosecution of
that crime is bound to focus primarily on the arresting officer's
conduct.
Table 5 presented the following figures on the proportion of defendants in the Narcotics and Rackets branches (which account for 80
per cent of the motions to suppress in Chicago) who have a motion to
suppress granted in their case:
Chicago Defendants with Motion to Suppress Granted

Gambling
Keeper of Gaming House
Lesser Gambling Offense
Average for all Gambling Offenses
Carrying Concealed Weapons
Narcotics

59%
45%
38%
45%
24%
33%

These figures are long standing. Data from 1950 and 1964 studies cited
earlier 23 4 showed comparable percentages for each of these offenses.
The important fact to add at this point is that in every single one of
these cases in which a motion to suppress was granted, the charges
were then dismissed. The motion to suppress was therefore the dispositive event in about half of all gambling cases, one-third of all narcotics
cases, and one-fourth of all weapons cases in Chicago. Those fractions
are large enough that proceedings for violations of these types of
crimes are bound to be focused largely upon issues pertinent to suppression of evidence, rather than upon issues pertaining to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. These are the only crimes in Chicago for
which this is likely to be true, for there are no others where the motion
to suppress is so prominent.
Tables 6 and 7 show that the per cent of defendants who are dismissed after granting a motion to suppress is only one to four per cent
in the District of Columbia, where prosecutor screening eliminates
cases in which a motion to suppress is likely to be granted. These
figures show that the motion to suppress probably uses only a tiny
fraction of the courtroom time in the District, and that its effects upon
the overall outcome of cases are so negligible that it is unlikely to
divert the attention of participants from the question of guilt or innocence. The interesting question for the District concerns the performance of the prosecutor's screening function and the possible effect
of the motion to suppress upon delay or diversion at that point.
234

See Table 4 and text accompanying notes 71 & 73 supra.
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Side Effects on the Criminal Justice System

The exclusionary rule is said to produce other undesirable side
effects on the criminal justice system. This subject is enormously
complicated, requiring systems analysis techniques to confront a host
of uncertainties about the cause of changes in the system. 23 5 The best
that can be done at this point is simply to suggest some possible negative side effects of the exclusionary rule, without pretending to specify
empirical methods by which they could be tested.
1. Changes in Substantive Rules. Edward L. Barrett, Jr. has argued
that "the exclusionary rule creates pressure upon the courts to weaken
the rules governing probable cause to make an arrest . . . where an

obviously guilty defendant is seeking to exclude from consideration
at his trial clear physical evidence of his guilt." 236 Wigmore cited the
same point as a possible "collateral perverse effect" of the exclusionary rule, though he admitted that it was difficult to demonstrate.2 37 In
support of his thesis that the Supreme Court "is in retreat from implementation of its system of constitutional criminal procedure," Edmund
W. Kitch cites a tendency to modify the content of the constitutional
right to security from unreasonable search and seizure according to
238
what can realistically be enforced by means of the exclusionary rule.

"It is all a bit backward," 239 he observes.
The assertions and fears of Professors Wigmore, Barrett and Kitch
are best approached in terms of expert analysis of judicial opinions.
It is doubtful that they can be tested empirically.
2. Delay. In areas like the District of Columbia, where motions to
suppress are noted for special hearing, such motions may be responsible for some delay in the disposition of individual cases. A study of
1165 criminal cases disposed of in the District of Columbia in 1965
showed that the average time between arraignment and final disposition was 9 weeks for defendants who filed no pretrial motions, 14
weeks for those who filed one motion, and 19 weeks (more than twice
as long) for those who filed two or more motions. 240 Only some of these
235 For a sample of the difficulties see D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, supra note 73, at ch. 4
(discussing changes in frequency of guilty pleas and acquittals at trial).
286 Barrett, supra note 155, at 55.
237 WicoR, supra note 213, § 2184, at 52 n.44.
238 Kitch, supra note 24, at 157, 157-72.
239 Id. at 166.
240 TAYLOR, NAVARRO & COHEN, DATA ANALYSES AND SIMULATION OF THE DIsraicr OF

COLUMBIA TRIAL COURT
Defense Analyses 1968).
were disposed without
whose cases were tried:

SYSTEM FOR THE PROCESSING OF FELONY DEFENDANTs 7 (Institute for
These figures were for the 910 defendants who pleaded guilty or
trial. There were comparable increases for the 255 defendants
14, 18 and 23 weeks, respectively.
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pretrial motions were motions to suppress. There is need for a separate
study to determine the separate delaying effect, if any, of motions to
suppress.
3. Guilty Pleas and Sentencing. The exclusionary rule can have an
important effect upon the timing and substance of guilty-plea bargaining and related sentencing decisions, especially in areas where bargaining occurs before the motion to suppress is litigated. Albert W.
Alschuler suggests that the exclusionary rule has intensified plea
bargaining in a number of ways.2 41 If the prosecutor is persuaded that
the defense may prevail on a motion to suppress, he is likely to try to
eliminate the risk of dismissal or acquittal by offering a favorable
sentencing recommendation to induce the defendant to plead guilty.
Even a motion that the defense is likely to lose presents a threat to the
scarce time resources of the prosecutor. The resolution of pretrial
motions to suppress and the briefing and argument of the appeals that
often result from their denial cut into the prosecutor's time and increase the backlog of cases. In order to keep this backlog under control
the prosecutor makes attractive sentencing recommendations to obtain
a higher proportion of guilty pleas. Knowing the favorable effect of
such pressure, defense counsel use the pretrial motion to suppress to
threaten the court and prosecutor with added delay, in order to force
a more favorable "deal." Thus, in areas where plea bargaining may
occur before the motion to suppress is litigated, the end result of the
exclusionary rule is thought to be lower sentences for persons who
would have been convicted anyway, and a guilty plea and sentence of
some persons, including some who are innocent, who would have gone
free if the motion had been litigated and won.242 If so, this raises
serious doubts about the fairness to society and to the defendant of a
system that accepts a guilty plea before a motion to suppress has been
resolved. Alleged infringements of vital constitutional rights ought not
be the occasion of reduced sentences that give a discount to the guilty
and an almost irresistible bargain to those who probably could not be
convicted. In this respect, a prior hearing on motions to suppress (the
usual practice in Chicago) seems preferable. The United States
Supreme Court recently passed an opportunity to require this method
when it refused to set aside a guilty plea on the ground that it had been
241 These suggestions appear in Alschuler, supra note 165, at 50, 56, 80-82, and were
further amplified for the author by personal conversations with Alschuler and by

examination of some pages of an unpublished manuscript by him.
242 For another suggestion that the "due process revolution" may be having the unintended effect of reducing overall sentence length and inducing guilty pleas by some
persons who could not be convicted, see D. OAKs & W. LEHMAN, supra note 73, at 80-81.
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induced by a prior involuntary confession. 243 The reasoning apparently

also covers guilty pleas allegedly induced by evidence obtained by an
improper search and seizure.
The numerical importance and current interest in the question of
plea bargaining and sentencing should be a strong incentive for
empirical inquiry to determine the true relationship between these
244
subjects and the exclusionary rule.

E.

Police Immunization of Criminals

The conferring of immunity upon an offender is an inevitable consequence of applying the exclusionary rule to any evidence that is
essential to the prosecution. The cost of freeing the guilty has already
been discussed.245 But there is an additional negative effect in the
manner in which they are freed, in the dangerous power this vests in
the police. The exclusionary rule permits police to immunize a criminal from prosecution by deliberately overstepping legal bounds in
obtaining vital evidence. In the leading opinion rejecting the exclusionary rule for the state of New York (holding that it should not be
imposed upon society without legislative action), Chief Judge Cardozo
identified this danger of the rule:
The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through
overzeal or indiscretion, to confer 246
immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious.
The "indiscretion" that confers immunity may be an act that conforms
to a norm of police behavior for which the suppression of evidence
is a known but not a desired consequence, such as an improper search
to get a weapon out of circulation. But it may also be a deliberate
overstepping of legal bounds in obtaining vital evidence for the express purpose of conferring immunity from prosecution. Such a result
may or may not conform to a norm of police behavior. Some police
are said to make bad arrests purposely in many juvenile cases to assure
that the juvenile cannot be found guilty and subjected to a harsh
243 McMann v. Richardson, 90 S. Ct. 678 (1970). For a discussion of the rule that a
guilty plea is a waiver of a claim of unreasonable search and seizure, see Amnot., 20
A.L.R.3d 724 (1968).
244 Alschuler suggests that plea bargaining seriously dilutes the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule. See also text accompanying note 164 supra. In this manner, plea bargaining may have more influence on the exclusionary rule than the rule has on plea
bargaining.
245 See text following note 212 supra.
246 People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926). Wigmore found this
argument "unpersuasive." WIGMORE, supra note 213, § 2184, at 52 n.43.
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penalty. Other less benign possibilities are contrary to police norms,
and raise ugly issues of corruption. 247 Samuel Dash considered that
the high proportion of defendants being released after granting of a
motion to suppress in gambling cases in Chicago in 1950 was due to
"corruption." After observing the routine of motion to suppress, testimony, and release, which involved the same police and the same events
day after day, Dash concluded that "the raids are made to immunize
the gamblers while at the same time satisfying the public that gamblers
248
are being harassed by the police."
Empirical Research. It is possible to approximate the total cost of
conferring immunity upon offenders due to the application of the
exclusionary rule. Earlier discussion of the extent to which the motion
to suppress is dispositive is addressed to that question.249 It is more
difficult to measure the portion of that immunity that is conferred
deliberately, and, because the triggering behavior is illegal, it is still
more difficult to measure the smaller fraction that is conferred deliberately and corruptly. Though offending officers will be evasive, police
department officials should be willing to cooperate because this type
of conduct probably violates police norms as well as legal rules. The
inquiry might proceed by a statistical grouping of all motions to suppress in various types of crimes, further subdivided by the various
officers who made the arrest and seizure. If some officers had noticeably
higher proportions of suppression of their evidence in a particular
crime, or for a particular defendant, this could be indicative of either
carelessness or corruption. But the evidence is not conclusive. There
is no apparent method by which the extent of this type of misbehavior
could be measured so long as it does not rise to the flagrant degree
Dash observed in the gambling cases.
F. Police Imposition of Extra-JudicialPunishment
Earlier discussion cited doubts that the exclusionary rule could
discourage police from arrests or seizures that were intended as extrajudicial punishments. 250 This section concerns the related negative
effect which suggests that the exclusion of evidence obtained by im247

The author spoke with one high police official who routinely examines all court

reports where evidence is suppressed in order to initiate further investigation where an
officer's testimony results in suppression of evidence with unusual frequency, especially
in cases where particular defense attorneys are involved.
248 Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 391-2
(1951). The same subject is referred to in the same way by the Operating Director of
the Chicago Crime Commission in Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 46, 58 (1957). The proportion of release was about 76% in
1950, and it is about 45% today. See Tables 4 & 5 supra.
249 See text accompanying note 234 supra.
250 See text following note 157 supra.
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proper means may actually encourage such misconduct by the police.2 51
Monrad Paulsen made this point:
Most disturbing is the argument that if the police are subject
to the restrictions of the exclusionary rule they cannot obtain
the convictions necessary to carry out their law enforcement
function, and if they cannot obtain such convictions they will
be tempted to harass suspects, to inflict extra-legal punishments. "The exclusionary rule," wrote Professor Waite, "has
those for
driven the police to methods less desirable than
252
which the judges shut truth from the jury's ears."
Joseph Goldstein has described a deliberate program of police harassment for the purpose of controlling gambling. 253 Suspects are
searched without legal grounds and if gambling paraphernalia is found
they are arrested and the police confiscate the contraband and money
(and the defendant's car, if it was involved) without any intention of
applying the criminal law. The suspect is promptly freed by legal process. No prosecution ensues since the search was illegal, but the confiscated property is retained. A prosecutor explained this procedure
by stating that "the police department [is] forced to find other means
of punishing, harassing and generally making life uneasy for gamblers"
because of the light penalties imposed on gambling offenses and the
stringent requirements of the search and seizure laws.254 Frank W.
Miller's American Bar Foundation study of prosecution practices in
Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin also observed the prevalence of confiscation as a remedy to compensate for the stringency of the search
and seizure laws. 255 Other investigators have noted the use of harassment as a technique of attacking prostitution, gambling and illegal
liquor sales, 256 crimes where convictions are frequently prevented by
the exclusionary rule.
The Columbia study stated that preventive patrol, which consists
of aggressive stop, search and confiscation practices, "seems to have
251 This is of course the converse of the common argument that if courts used illegally
obtained evidence this would foster police misconduct.
252 Paulsen, supra note 58, at 257, quoting Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54
MicH. L. Rzv. 169, 196 (1955). Elsewhere Professor Waite has urged that the exclusionary rule "has in practical application conduced to serious police misbehavior. If it did
not actually beget the 'tip-over raid,' it nurtured that vicious practice to its evil
florescence." Waite, supra note 27, at 685.
253 Goldstein, supra note 72, at 580-4.
254 Id. at 584.
255

F. MiLLE, supra note 78, at 248.

at 187, quoting LAFAvE, supra note 34, at 456,
473, 478; Note, PhiladelphiaPolice Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L REV.
1182, 1196-1200 (1952).
256 TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE PoLIcE
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grown recently as a means of avoiding the frustration of following
Mapp, 257 but it tendered no data on the subject. It is unlikely that
the exclusionary rule will directly deter the practice of preventive
patrol since this tactic is, by definition, undertaken without the intention that it lead to prosecution. Whether preventive patrol is actually
encouraged by the exclusionary rule is another question. Finally, Alan
M. Dershowitz has suggested that by preventing a criminal prosecution
the exclusionary rule may encourage the use of sexual psychopath
laws or other "prediction-prevention" commitment alternatives. 25
The exclusionary rule may also encourage a type of unintentional
illegality. Edward L. Barrett, Jr. has suggested that the exclusionary
rule may place pressure on the police "to make arrests earlier in the
investigative process than they might otherwise simply to insure that
the evidence secured, [since it is obtained by a search incident to
arrest] will ultimately be usable at the trial."259
Empirical Research. The extent to which the exclusionary rule
actually fosters police illegality probably cannot be measured by objective criteria, although observation of police organizations might
yield relevant impressions on the subject. The difficulty is the familiar
problem of identifying the responsible cause or causes for an observed
change. For example, an increase in police harassment or preventive
patrol after adoption of the exclusionary rule would not in itself confirm the argument since such a change in law enforcement methods
could be caused by many other factors. An additional difficulty is determining what changes have been made in police methods, especially
after passage of almost a decade since the Mapp opinion. Where police
conduct has resulted in written arrest reports, a comparative examination is still possible, as the Columbia study shows. But with practices
like preventive patrol, which would not normally be recorded in written documents, there is probably no written evidence upon which a
before-after comparison can be made. Police recollections unsubstantiated by written memoranda would not be sufficiently reliable.
257 Comment, supra note 83, at 100. Preventive patrol is described in note 160 supra.
258 Observation during Roundtable Meeting of Association of American Law Schools
in San Francisco, December 28, 1969. See generally Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal
Process:"A Knife that Cuts Both Ways," 51 JUDiCATURE 370 (1968); J. K!Tz, J. GOLDSTmN
& A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 540-4 (1967).
259 Barrett, supra note 155, at 66. Any such tendency should be reduced by the decision
approving the admissibility of evidence obtained by an appropriate "stop and frisk." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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G. Forestallingthe Development of Alternative Remedies
The exclusionary rule cannot be replaced as long as it remains a
constitutional requirement. However, there is no legal obstacle to supplementing the exclusionary rule, especially in areas where it is admittedly ineffective. 260 The obstacle is a practical one. The enormous
concentration and reliance upon the exclusionary rule may forestall
the development of alternative mechanisms for controlling improper
behavior by the police. By a peculiar form of federal preemption,
the Mapp decision may sap state officials' energy and determination to
control law enforcement officials in alternative ways that might prove
just as effective and even more comprehensive than the exclusionary
rule. Thus, the President's Crime Commission Task Force Report on
the Police observed that the police administrator is ambivalent about
the degree of his responsibility for controlling improper law enforcement behavior by his personnel:
[H]e often sees the methods by which the law is enforced as
involving matters which are the primary responsibility of
others outside the police establishment. This deference may,
in part, be attributable to the sharing of responsibilities with
other agencies-particularly the courts. Unlike internal matters over which the police administrator has complete control,
much of what the police do relating to crime and criminals is
dependent for approval upon the decisions of nonpolice agencies.

26 1

The report concludes that if the police are to develop a sense of responsibility in this area, they must be included in the important policymaking d'ecisions, such as those regarding the revision of substantive
and procedural laws, so that the final result will have a professional
identification to which they can loyally conform.
Empirical Research. This point probably cannot be demonstrated
by empirical evidence. A debater's answer is that the states had an opportunity to develop such alternatives between Wolf and Mapp, that
they did not do so, and that there is no reason to expect greater
creativity or impetus today.
260 Alfred Hill has recently urged that the Supreme Court preserve latitude for other
courts or legislatures to develop alternative remedies that might prove to be adequate
substitutes for the exclusionary rule. Hill, supra note 25, at 182-5. Of similar effect is
Chief Justice Burger's criticism of the exclusionary rule, coupled with his advocacy of
police discipline by "a commission or board which is predominantly civilian and external
rather than an internal police agency." Burger, supra note 56, at 16. An alternative tort
remedy is discussed in text following note 143 supra.
261 TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 29.
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Handcuffing the Police

Much of the law enforcement community's opposition to the exclusionary rule has been expressed in terms of the vivid metaphor
alleging that the rule "handcuffs" the police in the enforcement of the
criminal law. 262 In substance this familar argument is a protest against
the underlying constitutional and statutory rights. More often than
not, Yale Kamisar observes,
[W]hat they are really bristling about is tighter enforcement
of long standing restrictions. Thus, many in law enforcement
reacted to the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if the
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure had just
26
been written 3
The whole argument about the exclusionary rule "handcuffing"
the police should be abandoned. If this is a negative effect, then it is
an effect of the constitutional rules, not an effect of the exclusionary
rule as the means chosen for their enforcement. Police officials and
prosecutors should stop claiming that the exclusionary rule prevents
effective law enforcement.-In doing so they attribute far greater effect
to the exclusionary rule than the evidence warrants, and they are also
in the untenable position of urging that the sanction be abolished so
that they can continue to violate the rules with impunity. If the constitutional rules concerning arrest and search and seizure really prevent effective law enforcement, then law enforcement officers should
demonstrate that fact and forthrightly attempt to have those rules
changed by appropriate authority.
VII. POSTSCRIPT

Where the exclusionary rule is concerned, judges and scholars have
explained their decisions by asserting the deterrent effect of the rule,
262 See generally Kamisar, supra note 79.
263 Id. at 440. See also text accompanying note 215 supra. Unlike most prosecutors or
police, Arlen Specter is quite candid in his objection to the rule: "In brief, the advantage
of greater latitude for policemen in apprehending offenders outweighs the value of
marginal protection of civil liberties. It is more important to convict the guilty than to
prevent the unconstitutional search and seizure of the innocent which is only unpleasant
....
There can be no doubt that the Mapp decision has significantly impaired the
ability of the police to secure evidence to convict the guilty. How detrimental this has
been, however, is a matter of opinion rather than demonstrable fact." Specter, supra note
28, at 41-42. In protesting the way in which the Mapp decision has "significantly impaired the ability of the police to secure evidence to convict the guilty" Specter is
conceding that prior to the Mapp case the police violated constitutional rights with impunity, and that after the Mapp case they were deterred from doing so. The first admission is damaging. The second is doubtful.
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and then have supported that effect by recourse to polemic, rhetoric,
and intuition. If those are the acknowledged techniques in an evaluation of the exclusionary rule, then it should not be surprising if this
article ends by recording the author's own polemic on the rule. A
prior section concluded with a summary of the inferences that can
fairly be drawn from presently available evidence on the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. 264 The last two sections cited some
additional evidence of possible limitations and negative effects of the
exclusionary rule. This postscript draws upon that evidence, but it
brushes past the uncertainties identified in the discussion of the data
and makes some assertions that are not fully supported by it. What
follows is an argument, not a conclusion.
The exclusionary rule should be abolished, but not quite yet.
As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by the
police, the exclusionary rule is a failure. There is no reason to expect
the rule to have any direct effect on the overwhelming majority of
police conduct that is not meant to result in prosecutions, and there
is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts any deterrent effect on the
small fraction of law enforcement activity that is aimed at prosecution.
What is known about the deterrent effect of sanctions suggests that
the exclusionary rule operates under conditions that are extremely
unfavorable for deterring the police. The harshest criticism of the rule
is that it is ineffective. It is the sole means of enforcing the essential
guarantees of freedom from unreasonable arrests and searches and
seizures by law enforcement officers, and it is a failure in that vital
task.
The use of the exclusionary rule imposes excessive costs on the
criminal justice system. It provides no recompense for the innocent
and it frees the guilty. It creates the occasion and incentive for largescale lying by law enforcement officers. It diverts the focus of the
criminal prosecution from the guilt or innocence of the defendant to
a trial of the police. Only a system with limitless patience with irrationality could tolerate the fact that where there has been one wrong,
the defendant's, he will be punished, but where there have been two
wrongs, the defendant's and the officer's, both will go free. This would
not be an excessive cost for an effective remedy against police misconduct, but it is a prohibitive price to pay for an illusory one. As the
present Chief Justice has written:
Perhaps we can all agree on two basic aims: first, that deterring
official misconduct in law enforcement is a vital objective for
204

See text following note 114 supra.
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society; and second, that society and the administration of
justice are best served by vastly reducing, and if possible
eliminating, the need to exclude relevant and probative evidence from a criminal trial whose very truth-seeking function
2 15
is necessarily stultified to some degree by such exclusion.
Despite these weaknesses and disadvantages, the exclusionary rule
should not be abolished until there is something to take its place and
perform its two essential functions. If constitutional rights are to be
anything more than pious pronouncements, then some measurable
consequence must be attached to their violation. It would be intolerable if the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure could be
violated without practical consequence. It is likewise imperative to
have a practical procedure by which courts can review alleged violations of constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of those
rights. The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely apart from any
direct deterrent effect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial
review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees. By
demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the
violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and
magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long
term this may integrate some fourth amendment ideals into the value
26
system or norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies.
26 7
The opinion in Mapp v. Ohio properly relied on these advantages.
But Mapp mistakenly assumed that the exclusionary rule was the only
way to give judicial review and to grant credibility to the constitutional right. In fact, the exclusionary rule is a poor vehicle to accomplish either objective. Most people whose constitutional rights are
invaded are not prosecuted. Others who are prosecuted plead guilty
without having their claim adjudicated. The exclusionary rule provides no judicial review and no reinforcement of fourth amendment
values for either of these large groups.
As to search and seizure violations, the exclusionary rule should be
replaced by an effective tort remedy against the offending officer or
his employer. Some of the law reforms necessary to make such a remedy
265 Burger, supra note 56, at 10.
See generally Kamisar, supra note 79, at 4424; W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, at
504-5.
267 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (without the exclusionary rule "the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
266

so ephemeral ... as not to merit this Court's high regard as a -freedom 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' ").
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effective were discussed earlier. 26 A practical tort remedy would give
courts an occasion to rule on the content of constitutional rights (the
Canadian example shows how 269), and it would provide the real consequence needed to give credibility to the guarantee. A tort remedy
could break free of the narrow compass of the exclusionary rule, and
provide a viable remedy with attendant direct deterrent effect upon
the police whether the injured party was prosecuted or not. Such an
arrangement is long overdue. It is time to have a comprehensive judicial
remedy against all illegal arrests and searches and seizures by the police. And it is time to abandon the irrational and costly procedure by
which police behavior is reviewed only when the injured party is
prosecuted, and the only compensation for injury effectively puts both
guilty parties beyond the reach of the law.
208 See text accompanying note 144 supra.
269 See text following note 108 supra.

